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Introduction

Man always kills the thing he loves. And so we the pioneers have killed our wilderness. Some say
we had to. Be that as it may, I am glad I shall never be young without wild country to be young in.
— Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac

A 2018 report in Nature estimated that less than a quarter of Earth’s wilderness remains.
Wilderness, understood in the report as areas free of industrial scale activities and other human
pressures which result in significant biophysical disturbance, are important and necessary to
protect for many reasons. Aside from their vital role in biodiversity conservation and scientific
research, there is innate value in protecting such spaces where nature flourishes on its own—to let
forests grow un-sculpted, to let plants and animals thrive without modification or annihilation.1
These ecosystems foster life unique and only born in these spaces: there is no such thing as an
artificial wild. In this understanding, the wilds are not raw materials to seize, exploit, or consume—
wilds are spaces where natural flora and fauna must be allowed to develop without undue influence
from human beings.
No report has attempted to estimate the loss of our mental wilds. By mental wilds, I am
referring to our private mental space which protects our natural human autonomy—otherwise
referred to as privacy. One of the reasons why privacy as protection from undue external influences

1

It is estimated that around 77% of land (excluding Antarctica) and 87% of the ocean has been
modified by the direct effects of human activities (Watson et al 2018, para. 1). During a 2017
conference in Vatican City, where scientists announced that an estimated that 50% of all species
on Earth could go extinct by the end of the century, biologist Peter Raven remarked: “The
extinctions we face pose an even greater threat to civilization than climate change, for the simple
reason they are irreversible” (Haro 2017, para. 2).
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is undertheorized is because privacy has traditionally been conceived as not letting certain
information out: not letting others access our personal information. In the age of surveillance
capitalism, however, privacy is also about not letting certain information be allowed to come back
in: not letting our personal information be used to exert undue influence over us. When we engage
with modern technological goods and services (which we require to fulfill our modern personhood)
our human experience is claimed by corporations as free raw material for their hidden commercial
practices of extraction, prediction, and sales. This information is necessary for the tools of
instrumentarianism which saturate the digital economy. Instrumentarianism is the power to know
and shape human behavior toward other’s ends. By modifying our thoughts and behaviors (often
without our awareness), instrumentarian tools complicate our ability to think and act
autonomously. And in order to be autonomous, we need space independent from undue influence
from others. Privacy, like Earth’s wilderness, provides crucial distance. Like the precious flora and
fauna found in Earth’s wilderness, there is value in human autonomy in its own right. We don’t
want all of Earth to be a beautifully arranged garden just like we don’t want ourselves living as
efficiently orchestrated automatons; as we value nature growing according to its own designs, so
do we value autonomy.
Surveillance capitalism yields many harms, but its creation of instrumentarianism is
arguably the most worrying. Currently these tools complicate our autonomy in inappropriate ways,
but the potential threat they pose to our autonomy makes them intolerable. Considering privacy’s
essential role in developing our autonomy, as well as the existence of a thriving market centered
around disrupting our autonomy through our diminished privacy, it is important that whatever sort
of logic we are using to support an exchange that removes our privacy prove justified.
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While philosophers continue to debate how best to reconcile emerging technologies with
our desire for privacy, no one is really addressing the solution society has already tacitly accepted:
that it is okay to infringe upon an individual’s privacy in exchange for accessing modern
technological goods and services, so long as the individual consents. Social contract theory holds
that individuals consent either explicitly or implicitly by surrendering some of their freedoms to
an authority in exchange for their other rights or to maintain social order. In attempting to identify
the social contract negotiating our privacy and access to modern technological goods and services,
I adopt the term “technosocial” from Shannon Vallor, who I will later explain makes the
convincing case that a modern virtue ethics should explicitly address our relationship with modern
technology.
Perhaps the most pervasive and well-known form of this technosocial contract is the ritual
of clicking “I Agree” to whatever terms and conditions any given technological service or device
is imposing upon you. Legal experts label these terms-of-service agreements as “contracts of
adhesion” because they impose take-it-or-leave-it conditions on users whether they like it or not,
often referring to them as “click-wrap” because most people get wrapped in these oppressive
contract terms without ever reading the agreement (Zuboff 2019, 48). And despite studies2
determining that the vast majority of users don’t read before clicking, most courts have upheld the
legitimacy of click-wrap agreements. Even the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
passed by the European Union in 2016—currently the strongest and boldest privacy legislation
protecting the data of individuals using the technological devices and services we’ve become so
reliant on—still hinges on this basic technosocial contract. So long as you consent, then

2

One study conducted by Carnegie Mellon in 2008 calculated that a reasonable reading of all the
privacy policies that one encounters in a year would require seventy-six full workdays at a national
opportunity cost of $781 billion (Zuboff 2019, 50).
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exchanging your privacy to access the basic goods and services you need to compete and thrive in
modern life is justified.
I argue this exchange remains unjustified because meaningful consent cannot be formed
through our current technosocial contract. Concisely put, my argument runs as follows:
A. Our current technosocial contract justifies the exchange of an individual’s privacy for
access to modern technological goods and services by requiring an individual’s
consent.
B. As modern human beings, we require access to modern technological goods and
services to enjoy our modern personhood, to enjoy the goods of modern life and fulfill
our autonomy. No one can be reasonably expected to decline the goods of modern life;
to click disagree on our modern personhood is to endure an unbearable harm.
C. Modern technological goods and services operate under an exploitative, harmful
economic order best understood as surveillance capitalism. This system profoundly
diminishes our privacy. This loss of privacy allows others access to our autonomy
through instrumentarianism. Instrumentarian tools modify our thoughts and behaviors,
often without our awareness; it is through these tools that our mental wilds are cut away
and our autonomy becomes vulnerable. To have one’s autonomy disrupted and made
vulnerable such a way is to endure an intolerable harm.
D. Given B and C, it is problematic to exchange privacy for access to modern
technological goods and services. If an individual declines to consent, they are denied
the means to realize modern personhood and fulfill their autonomy—an unbearable
harm. But if an individual accepts, then they’re entering an exploitative system of
various harms where instrumentarian tools endanger their autonomy. Choosing
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between these options doesn’t seem like much of a choice; this exchange doesn’t feel
morally transformative.
E. Leading theories on consent agree with D, though none agree on what makes this
exchange problematic. Although this exchange doesn’t fit the narrow definition of
coercion in these theories, this is the most appropriate term. Denying an individual’s
access to modern personhood pushes this exchange toward being a coercive offer, while
there is also something inherently coercive about requiring individuals autonomously
consent to endanger their autonomy on a marketplace built around disrupting
autonomy.
F. Consent and coercion are incompatible. I argue we have good reason to regard this
exchange as coercive, meaning it is incapable of producing consent. Furthermore, even
if we do not want to use the term coercion to describe this exchange, leading theories
on consent still view this exchange as failing to be morally transformative—meaning
this exchange is still incapable of producing meaningful consent.
G. Because of E and F, our technosocial contract as stated in A remains unjustified: when
exchanging our privacy for access to modern technological goods and services, it
cannot be said that we truly consent.
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Part I: Privacy & Autonomy

PRIVACY AS PROTECTION FROM UNDUE EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
Though scholars continue to revise our understanding of privacy, humans have always
required privacy to feel human. The need for privacy has been appreciated in different ways from
culture to culture. During the Heian period in ancient Japan, ladies in waiting used special halfsewn curtains at the entrance of their bedchamber: objects could pass through the bottom, while
the prying eyes of their suitors could be kept in check.3 Ancient Greek philosophers debated the
distinction between ‘outer’ and ‘inner’, public and private, and society and solitude (Holvast 2009,
15). In Catholicism, priests listen to confessions in private booths called confessionals, bound by
God to never disclose anything they’ve heard. While differences in how privacy is appreciated
continue to this day, general trends can still be gleaned from the long history of humanity’s
appreciation for privacy. In his essay chronicling this history, Jan Holvast identifies three such
trends: 1) that the needs for one’s privacy has traditionally been balanced against the needs of
society, 2) that technology has typically been understood as presenting challenges for privacy, and
3) that privacy has always been seen as something under attack. Yet privacy has also been
historically difficult to define. In the last few centuries, this has been largely due to advancements
in technology outpacing our philosophical and legal scholarship around our concept of privacy,
resulting in obvious and devastating invasions of privacy being not only legal but difficult to
defend against.

3

Sei Shōnagon, writer and court lady of Empress Consort Teishi, called it the ‘curtain of the State’,
and it did not guarantee complete privacy—as Robin Duke notes during his introduction to a
translation of her work: “Sei Shōnagon and her fellow ladies in waiting were forever ensconced
behind their screens, overhearing and overheard” (Duke 1979, 20).
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Despite being outpaced, researchers across disciplines have given us many useful
definitions of privacy. Philosopher Charles Fried conceived of privacy as an intrinsic value,
arguing that privacy is necessary for forming intimacy and establishing other values we regard as
essential to being human, such as love, friendship, and trust.4 Philosopher Dorota Mokrosinska
argues privacy functions as a social good that citizens require to engage in a political democracy.
Legal scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued privacy is the right to be let alone. One
particularly useful definition of privacy comes from information scientist Helen Nissenbaum, who
views privacy as contextual integrity: the appropriate flow of personal information. Because
information technology enables pervasive surveillance, massive databases, and near-instant
distribution of information across the globe—and because these technologies are able to know us
better than we know ourselves5—she argues they present a new form of violation to our privacy
that we need to address. Her solution is to understand our right to privacy as the right to live in a
world in which our expectations about the flow of personal information are mostly met, where
these expectations are shaped by social norms, with both local and general values, ends, and
purposes (Nissenbaum 2010, 231).

4

A common critique against such conceptions of privacy is that privacy is therefore not a useful
stand-alone concept because almost all the time privacy could be swapped with another right which
was infringed upon instead. This is the argument of Judith Jarvis Thomson, who argues we should
dismiss the concept of privacy all together. But even if this were the case, privacy is still useful to
us as a cluster concept—an accumulated value comprised through other values resembling each
other. Analyzing privacy might require us to analyze privacy in particular contexts, but when
shouldn’t the context affect the analysis of profound, difficult to define but culturally cherished
values such as privacy?
5
This is because various technological innovations have made it possible to extract more
information than ever before, and we often do not have access to this information. This is explained
further in Part III.
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Yet while this understanding of privacy seems to adequately address the information side
of this process, this does not adequately address the transmission side of this process. It’s not just
about the context because there is something transformative about what we can do with our data.
Shoshana Zuboff coined the phrase “surveillance capitalism” in her book the The Age of
Surveillance Capitalism. Under surveillance capitalism, our human experience is claimed as free
raw material by corporations. These surveillance capitalists then use this material as a necessary
resource in their commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales. This economic logic
resulted in the realization that the best way to predict an outcome was to guarantee that outcome.
This is the origin of instrumentarianism. Zuboff argues instrumentarianism is a new species of
power: the power to know and shape human behavior toward other’s ends (Zuboff 2019, 8). This
power is realized through tools that—enabled by the loss of our privacy—grant others undue
influence over us. Instrumentarian technologies are the tools at the heart of our surveillance
capitalist economy, capable of modifying our thoughts and behaviors, often without our awareness.
This complicates our autonomy to a potentially unsustainable level. It is through this new and
unprecedented technology that our privacy is about more than the contextual integrity: privacy is
not just about the appropriate flow of personal information, because this personal information is
weaponized through transformative technologies to exert undue influence over us and disrupt our
autonomy.
I argue we can better understand privacy as a cluster concept, best articulated through
Daniel Solove’s application of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s framework for family resemblances.
According to Wittgenstein, there does not exist an objectively true link between a word and the
things to which it refers: there is no innate connection between the word and what it signifies. This
means that while some concepts might not share a single trait, they still relate to each through “a
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complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail” (Wittgenstein 1921, 66). Like a web without a center point, a
concept (family) may be comprised of other accumulated values (siblings) that resemble each other
yet lack a singular analogous trait.
Solove advocates for a pragmatic approach to privacy: conceptualizing privacy from the
bottom up, from particular contexts rather than getting stuck in the abstract. After reviewing
previous conceptions of privacy, he finds them all either too broad or too narrow—a reoccurring
problem for scholars trying to reconcile our desire for privacy in the wake of recent technological
developments. By too narrow, he means definitions of privacy that are too rigid and unadaptable.
By too broad, he means definitions of privacy that are too wide and all-encompassing. Instead, he
wants to conceive of privacy by getting close to how we use with word ‘privacy’ without
sacrificing logical consistency.
Instead of defining privacy by isolating core characteristics, we can instead understand
privacy as drawing from a common pool of similar elements. According to Solove, the concept of
privacy can be dealt with under six general headings: 1) the right to be let alone, 2) limited access
to the self and the ability to shield oneself from unwanted access by others, 3) secrecy or the
concealment of certain matters from others, 4) control over personal information and exercising
control over personal information, 5) personhood and the protection of one’s personality,
individuality, and dignity, 6) intimacy and control over or limited access to one’s intimate
relationships or aspects of life (Solove 2002, 1009).
These headings are not perfect as there is significant overlap between them—and we still
might wonder what exactly allows them to relate to one another. But we don’t need perfection.
Reflexive equilibrium—a philosophical methodology for justifying principles of inductive logic
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developed by Nelson Goodman—holds that we can keep shifting our concepts and cases where
those concepts are applicable, until they overlap one another. We might never be able to give a full
account for sufficient conditions for privacy, but we don’t need to: we may keep revising our
theory of privacy as time goes on, and the concept of privacy can still prove useful. Classifying all
the points in the web of privacy might yield categories with fuzzy boundaries that are in a constate
state of flux, but we only need fixed and sharp boundaries for special purposes. Understanding
privacy in this way still proves useful. This is especially true considering how advances in
technology continuously unveils new quagmires that force us to reevaluate our moral systems and
the virtues we uphold. A certain amount of malleability must be built into our definition of privacy.
Solove’s definition allows us to address the challenges instrumentarianism pose to our
understanding of privacy.
Furthermore, the threat of instrumentarianism underscores what could be considered that
particular thing which allows Solove’s headings to resemble one another: privacy’s special
relationship to the growth and maintenance of our autonomy. This is because in each heading the
violation of privacy implies a harm to our autonomy. While the tools of instrumentarianism appear
to most explicitly align with his category of limited access to the self and the ability to shield
oneself from unwanted access by others, instrumentarianism impacts each of his categories. This
is because of privacy’s fundamental role in our autonomy, which is precisely what tools of
instrumentarianism exploit in order to access our autonomy.
I do not wish to say that this relationship is the only thing which makes privacy meaningful
or distinctive. Even though privacy as protection from undue external influences is the most useful
definition of privacy in the age of surveillance capitalism, it is important to recognize that this
definition is not static—we simply don’t know how future technologies will force us to revise this
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new definition of privacy, just as the tools of instrumentarianism forced us to revise our old
definition of privacy. Solove’s framework for privacy includes this process of revision, and
therefore avoids many of the technical challenges faced by privacy definitions which are either too
broad or too narrow.
Due to the malleability Solove’s conception of privacy entails, coupled with the fact that
each of his headings is impacted by instrumentarianism, I argue that we can best understand
privacy through his application of Wittgenstein’s framework for family resemblances. And when
we apply our modern of context surveillance capitalism and its tools of instrumentarianism
(explained in Part III) to this framework, as well as the following investigations into how our
privacy is necessary for our autonomy, I argue we can then define privacy as protection from undue
external influences.

AUTONOMY AS EXPERIENCING OUR AUTHENTIC SELVES
Human autonomy is widely considered one of the most important values we hold. Although
there are many illuminating accounts of autonomy, I will focus on the Kantian sense of autonomy,
as it is one of the most influential accounts of autonomy in modern philosophy. Under this
framework for autonomy, we are autonomous when our authentic selves are the source of the
things we do.
In his early investigations into moral autonomy Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,
Immanuel Kant argues that what makes us agents is our capacity to find values in things. We create
the sorts of things that are valuable in the world. To ascribe values, we require a certain degree of
autonomy: for values to be considered mine in any meaningful sense, I as an agent must evaluate
them and endorse them. What makes our values meaningful is that we ourselves chose them.
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Values can’t be chosen for us, nor can they be an unconscious, automatic reaction to some external
stimuli. When we as agents exercise our capacity to find values in things—when we deliberate and
decide whether or not to endorse our attitudes—we are experiencing our actions as coming from
our authentic selves.
Christine Korsgaard, one of the leading Kantian scholars in modern philosophy, explains
this process further. In Self-Constitution, she argues we can understand Kant’s definition of
autonomy in two ways: 1) that you are the source of your actions which come from you in the right
sort of way, or 2) what matters is your endorsing things in the right sort of way, regardless of where
they came from. Both ways of understanding Kant’s definition of autonomy reiterate our role as
agents: we can’t just respond to the pushes and pulls of the world, but we must use our additional
perspective as agents to evaluate those pushes and pulls. The “right sort of way” Korsgaard stresses
are the conditions through which we experience our actions as coming from our authentic selves.
For Kant and Korsgaard, an authentic self is the achieved state of personhood after having
evaluated and endorsed values for ourselves. When we do so, our authentic selves become the
source of the things we do. This is important under Kantian ethics, because the capacity to decide
for oneself and pursue a course of action is essential to the categorial imperative—which Kant
viewed as the supreme guiding principle of morality. According to Korsgaard, this principle holds
that we are morally required to see ourselves and the things that lead us to act as equal worth as
other people’s capacities to have values (Korsgaard 2009, 84). Human beings should be treated as
an end in themselves and not as a means to an end. In other words, we are morally required to
respect each other as agents just as we must respect ourselves as agents. This means respecting
autonomy: allowing all individuals to be autonomous by experiencing their authentic selves as the
source of the things they do.
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PRIVACY AS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR AUTONOMY
Claiming privacy as a necessary condition for autonomy isn’t that controversial.
Philosophical literature on privacy generally accepts that privacy plays a role in our autonomy—
either by explicitly saying so or implicitly requiring such in its logical framework. Another reason
why I chose to focus on Kantian autonomy is because this framework does not explicitly mention
privacy, whereas the ethics I will be using later on do. Perhaps the reason why the relationship
between privacy and autonomy has been undertheorized is because we’ve never had technology
so capable of exploiting this relationship at such a global, inconspicuous scale. Most philosophers
also agree that the technological developments in the last few decades have outpaced the general
public’s ability to understand how their privacy is compromised by them. Zuboff goes even further.
She compares the introduction of instrumentarianism during the age of surveilliance capitalism to
the introduction of totalitarianism during the world wars: in both cases, Western publics (especially
the US) were genuinely unable to grasp the enormity of what was underway, “literally boggling
minds” (Zuboff 2019, 356). Whereas totalitarianism was a political project that converged with
economics to overwhelm society, “instrumentarianism is a market project that converges with the
digital to achieve its own unique brand of social domination” (Zuboff 2019, 360).
With surveillance and instrumentarian technologies being so pervasive throughout our
modern technological goods and services, it’s important we clarify the relationship between
privacy and autonomy. I argue the best way we can think of this relationship in the age of
surveillance capitalism is understanding privacy as protection from undue external influence.
Privacy is important for autonomy because if we are influenced in the wrong sort of way by our
environment then our authentic self is compromised, and then we cannot be autonomous. Privacy
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is what buffers against such negative environmental influences. Specifically, privacy helps keep
us from being unduly influenced by others.
This is because privacy provides the time and space free from external pressures for us to
decide what we want for ourselves. It is in these mental wilds where we’re free to tinker with
alternative thoughts or hone our shunned desires. Zuboff casts this space as sanctuary, noting how
the Greek origins for this word as well as old English common law emphasize the link between
sanctuary and “the unplunderable” (Zuboff, 2019, 478). Historically, sanctuaries have been viewed
as fail-safes: guaranteed exits made available away from totalizing power, refuge found in another
city, community, or religious place of worship. In a similar way can we view our mental wilds: as
sanctuary, a fail-safe for our autonomy, a protective barrier to stop certain kinds of information or
illicit influences from coming in. By safeguarding privacy, we ensure that we’re free from
inappropriate outside influences—influences which would otherwise compromise our autonomy
by interfering with our ability to experience our authentic selves as the source of the things we do.
I argue that privacy is a necessary condition for the Kantian conception of autonomy. In
both of Korsgaard’s interpretations of Kant, privacy functions as that ‘right sort of way’ in which
we are the source of our actions or endorse our actions. Consider how important it is for Kant that
we as agents have the capacity to ascribe values in the world. For us to ascribe values—for us to
have enough autonomy to meet the threshold of being an agent—we require privacy. After all, for
values to be considered mine it must ultimately be me who chose them. In other words, I have to
experience this choice as originating from my authentic self. It cannot come from my authentic
self if this choice is made because of other undue external influences. Privacy serves as a necessary
buffer against this. When we lose privacy, we lose that space to properly ascribe values. And if
can’t evaluate what’s valuable or not, then nothing is valuable. This means that under a Kantian
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conception of autonomy, not only would privacy be a necessary condition of autonomy, but it
would become morally impermissible to waive our rights to privacy. For now, however, we can
move forward having established that privacy is necessary for autonomy, and that we can best
clarify this relationship as privacy protecting our autonomy from undue external influences.
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Part II: Modern Personhood

A LIFE WORTH CHOOSING
One of the earliest and most influential concepts in moral philosophy is what Socrates
called the “good life”: the kind of life that is most worthy of a human being, the kind of life worth
choosing from among all the different ways we might live (Vallor 2016, 2). For example, most
would agree that a life full of fear and isolation is fundamentally less worth choosing over a life
full of peace and friendship. Such a life might still have value, but since there are much better
alternatives, that life would not be a life worth choosing.
In our modern age, the life worth choosing is a life of modern personhood. By modern
personhood, I mean the sort of autonomous state achieved through certain standards of living our
society appears to uphold as ideal. Employment, education, healthcare—these are so essential to
the modern citizen that many characterize having adequate access to them as a human rights issue.
I define these goods which modern citizens can reasonably expect to enjoy (and that they require
to fulfill their modern personhood) as the goods of modern life. We send our children to school
not because we demand them to choose this life, but because we view the goods of modern life as
being so valuable that they at least have the right to initially enjoy them. Furthermore, because the
goods of modern life are necessary to compete and thrive in our pursuit of modern personhood,
we want to make sure our children start out with access to these goods.
My conception of modern personhood and the goods of modern life comes from the fact
that there are certain basic needs human beings have in order to live a good life. These needs have
been filled in many different ways throughout history, but in our modern world these needs are
increasingly filled or facilitated by modern technological goods and services. The overwhelming
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majority of U.S. employers now pay employees via direct deposit instead of cash or check—
meaning you’ll need a bank account, as well as an email and phone number to access that account.
Using the internet has replaced using books from the library as the primary means of research for
students, while health professionals now store our health records in databases instead of filing
cabinets. Upcoming musicians can’t afford to ignore streaming services or podcasting, while many
artists rely on crowd-funding through sites like Patreon. If you want to stay in touch with friends
or loved ones during the rolling lockdowns of the coronavirus pandemic, then you might rely on
Zoom—a video communication software program that many schools, business, and governmental
agencies used to continue functioning during lockdowns. Or perhaps you’re among the 85% of
U.S. adults who rely on their smartphone6—a device so integral to the daily lives of many that
nearly half of adults reported that they “couldn’t live without” them.7
To further clarify how we use modern technological goods and services to fulfill our
modern personhood, I will explain how we rely on social media to fulfill our need for social
connection in our modern time. Social media are interactive forms of media on the internet through
which users publish and exchange content. Perhaps one of the most well-known goods of modern
life is the degree to which we are now able to connect to one another across the globe through
social media. Social media has revolutionized the way we organize, communicate, and express
ourselves in modern life—so much so that “increasingly, no young person who wants a social life
can afford not to be active” on social media (Zuboff 2019, 446). With approximately 72% of
Americans using Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or Snapchat, social media has become a vital tool
for political engagement.8 LinkedIn promises connections and opportunities professionals can’t

6

Pew Research Center 2021, “Mobile Fact Sheet”
Anderson 2015, “6 facts about Americans and their smartphones”
8
Pew Research Center 2021, “Social Media Fact Sheet”
7
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afford to miss, while Tinder and Hinge are among various dating apps people use to find romantic
relationships.
Grindr is a particularly interesting example. While gay men have always used subtle visual
codes to identify each other in heteronormative cultures, the launch of Grindr in 2009 slowly
pushed this identification online. Grindr is the largest geosocial app for queer folk, with almost
four million daily active users worldwide (Tankovska 2021, para. 1). Regardless of whether Grindr
acts as a positive force or a toxic9 force in the lives of its users, its impact on gay culture and what
it means to be a modern gay man is indisputable. For many gay men who want to meet other gay
men for a date or casual sex, they need to be on Grindr. In homophobic regions in the US and
abroad (such as countries like Jamaica and Uganda where homosexuality is illegal, or countries
lacking LGBTQ+ protections like Russia and China), Grindr can function as the only safe and
viable means for a gay man to communicate or arrange to meet other gay men. Others need Grindr
because modern culture exerts intense pressure for them to have a presence on this app. Anecdotes
about gay men scrolling on Grindr while at a dance club or on a date abound, but a better way to
understand what’s going on here is to think of Grindr as a vital tool that gay men require to compete
and thrive in the economy of love—especially when they live in an area that’s hostile to this type
of love. To not participate in this app becomes a form of self-imposed celibacy. To be offline is to
become invisible. Simply put, if you’re gay and not on Grindr, you might hardly feel gay at all.

9

For all of Grindr’s benefits, Grindr is commodifying. You package yourself. You parse every bit
of your flesh into digits, you brand yourself with labels called tribes. Though Grindr eventually
launched a campaign called “Kindr” to quell the rampant racism, transphobia, fat-shaming, and
bullying on the app, research continues to show that Grindr negatively impacts the mental health
of its users, with common ailments being addiction, depression, and (ironically) isolation
(Bloodworth 2018, para. 9).
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My point in detailing the example of Grindr is to demonstrate how deep our dependency
on social media for our basic need of social connection has become. Again, this isn’t to say there
aren’t other ways to fulfill this need, but in our modern age social media is increasingly becoming
a necessary way we do so. Depending on your identity, this need might run even deeper.10 Aside
from family and friends, our jobs might require us to use social media, in addition to certain
schooling courses that require students to use social media (even if for just a project). Furthermore,
the modern life our society appears to promote certainly includes the connection only social media
can bring, whether that’s being able to livestream a revolution or videocall a loved one on their
deathbed.11
We use such modern technological goods and services to access the goods of modern life.
Just as enjoying the goods of modern life in 1950s America entailed owning your own home and
driving your own car, enjoying the goods of modern life today entails having access to social
media. As one of the goods of modern life, social media helps us fulfill our modern personhood.
Simply put, living a modern life as a modern person means accessing certain technological goods
and services which enable or facilitate our modern existence. If we want to flourish in modern life,
then we need the tools that help us do so. And though not everyone chooses this life worth
choosing, the investment we put into our children (public schooling, children’s health insurance
programs) seems to suggest we at the very least want to enable our children to pursue this life.

10

If identities have different degrees of reliance on technological goods and services, then some
identities might be even more vulnerable to the coercive nature of our current social contract than
others. While my Grindr example focuses on those identifying as gay men, other identities should
also be analyzed in this way. Investigating how our modern technological goods and services might
prevent marginalized peoples from meaningfully performing or developing their identities would
be an extremely insightful project—but for now I will only note that such a threat of identity denial
certainly warrants deeper analysis.
11
Many did just this over the last year, as the coronavirus pandemic forced people to say their final
goodbyes over videocalls due to quarantine.
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And if that is the case, then we also must acknowledge that individuals require access to modern
technological goods and services in this pursuit.

EUDAIMONIC & TECHNOMORAL VIRTUE ETHICS
Ethics can be broadly understood as reflective inquiry into the good life—the life worth
choosing. Virtue ethics focuses on the role moral virtues play in achieving this good life. Moral
virtues are the states or stable dispositions of a person’s character, such as honesty or patience.
According to virtue ethics, moral virtues should be actively cultivated and properly integrated
through correct actions and practices, as they lead to deliberate, effective, and reasoned choices of
the good. Reasoning is central to virtue ethics (holding that agents should always assess the context
of a situation before expressing their virtues), but an agent’s emotions, habits, and desires are just
as important. In other words, a virtuous person not only thinks and acts appropriately, but also
feels and wants appropriately. While Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is the most influential
account of virtue in Western philosophy, other works from East and Southeast Asia also helped
establish the field of virtue ethics. In ancient China, Kongzi (Latinized as Confucius) originated
the moral philosophy known as Ruism, while on the Indian subcontinent Nepal-born Siddhārtha
Gautama founded the religious and philosophical practice of Buddhism.
In assessing our technosocial contract I will be adopting eudaimonic virtue ethics as
conceived by Lorraine Besser-Jones, with additional consideration to the technomoral virtue ethics
as conceived by Shannon Vallor. I believe these moral frameworks are logically compelling and
well-suited for this project. Eudaimonic virtue ethics reframes morality around our psychological
well-being, while technomoral virtue ethics draws from Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist
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virtues to refocus morality on what is most likely to increase our chances of flourishing in our
global technosocial conditions.
Besser-Jones advocates for our virtue ethics to be guided by the psychological conception
of eudaimonic well-being, rather than the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia. Thinking of virtue
in instrumental terms, she restructures virtues in service of our innate psychological needs. She
does this because empirical evidence shows that our innate psychological needs are just as vital
for our psychological health as innate biological needs are vital for biological health, with
researchers noting that “individuals cannot thrive without satisfying [innate psychological needs]
any more than people can thrive with water but not food” (Besser-Jones 2017, 14). She also details
how empirical research stresses that innate psychological needs are important and impactful for
individuals regardless if they’re conscious of them or not—what counts is having experiences
which satisfy those needs. She identifies three innate psychological needs to model her virtues on:
competence, relatedness, and autonomy.
Besser-Jones defines autonomy through her psychological conception of autonomy: the
need to experience ourselves as the origin of our own behavior, to engage in activities we perceive
to be our own and endorsed as our own. In other words, to experience ourselves as the source of
the things we do. One of three good psychological states her virtues strive for is the development
of certain cognitive structures that operate both as a regulatory feedback mechanism and as an aid
to the actual implementation of individual goals—an important state for maintaining our
autonomy. She argues that autonomous motivation (when agents perceive their goals as
autonomously legislated) is much more productive than controlled motivation, where goals are
imposed upon them (Besser-Jones 2017, 137). For this and many other reasons does Besser-Jones
argue that acting virtuously entails acting in ways which foster our autonomy.
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Another core commitment Besser-Jones adheres to during her work Eudaimonic Ethics is
psychological realism. Psychological realism holds that moral theorizing ought to be conducted
with a psychologically realistic picture of human nature. In this project, I too will adopt this
commitment. If we’re trying to figure out whether or not our technosocial contract is justified, we
should stay mindful of how we can realistically expect people to react to this contract—specifically
on their psychological reaction to the two choices our technosocial contract presents us: to enjoy
modern personhood at the cost of your privacy or to not enjoy modern personhood at all.
I would also like to consider technomoral virtue ethics in my analysis of our technosocial
contract. In her book Technology and the Virtues, Vallor admits that many contemporary scholars
argue that Confucianism and Buddhism don’t share any robust conceptual core with Aristotelian
virtue ethics, but she counters that there are convincing arguments for why these three traditions
do indeed share a conceptual core. One strategy she details is comparative philosopher Bryan Van
Norden’s thin/thick distinction for moral concepts. Thin concepts only give the essential structure
of an idea, whereas thick concepts flesh out that idea in greater detail. Using this framework,
Norden identifies at least four thin commitments shared by virtue ethics traditions, which Vallor
summarizes as 1) a conception of the ‘highest human good’ or ‘human flourishing’, 2) a conception
of moral virtues as cultivated states of character manifested by exemplary persons, 3) a conception
of the practical path of moral self-cultivation, and 4) a conception of what human beings are
generally like (Vallor 2016, 44). This is important because it allows a virtue ethic that is pluralistic
(open to more than one mode of expression of human flourishing) and malleable (adapted to the
needs of the present human condition and environment). Vallor also cites philosopher Alasdair
MacIntyre in defense of virtue ethics. Although MacIntyre rejects the notion of extracting a single
list of universal moral virtues from these diverse traditions, he believes they do share a conceptual
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core. He argues a given reference to a virtue is only meaningful 1) within the context of a
recognized human practice dedicated to securing moral goods internal to that practice, 2) where
that practice is embedded in a coherent narrative concerning a whole human life, and 3) where that
life is itself understood as participating in a shared moral tradition of seeking the highest good for
a human being (Vallor 2016, 45).
While virtue ethics has fallen out of popularity over the centuries, Vallor makes a
compelling case for why we should revisit them. She argues that “any contemporary theory of
ethics—that is, a theory of what counts as a good life for human beings—must include an explicit
conception of how to live well with technologies” (Vallor 2016, 3). Our moral practices have
always been impacted by our technologies because our technologies alter our thoughts, behaviors,
and judgement. Through technology, new possibilities for human action are born, while others are
disabled or withheld—introducing new and complicated questions of morality. Vallor offers the
example of how the introduction of bows and arrows gave humans the ability to kill more
efficiently from farther away, therefore introducing new moral dilemmas of whether or not it was
right or wrong for them to do so given a particular situation. Now with nuclear bombs, you can
now instantly obliterate entire countries with relative ease. With genetic modification, you can
alter your child before it’s born. Vaccines save lives, but should they be mandatory? Automation
makes production cheaper for businesses and prices cheaper for customers, but how do we choose
who gets to be replaced by a machine and who doesn’t? Again and again, we’ve seen new
technologies give rise to new complications for those wishing to simply live a full and happy
human life. This suggests that technology should indeed be explicitly addressed by modern ethics.
And though technology has always complicated morality, there is something truly new and
unique about the power of modern technology. Vallor notes how never before has our
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technological activity modified the very planetary conditions which makes life possible. This leads
Vallor to argue that decisions in the 21st century about how to live well are not just moral decisions,
but technomoral choices, “for they depend on the evolving affordances of the technological
systems that we rely upon to support and mediate our lives in ways and to degrees never before
witnessed” (Vallor 2016, 2). Our collective moral choices in technological contexts affect the wellbeing of other species, people across the globe, and generations not yet born. And it’s increasingly
unclear how much the future moral labor of our species will be performed by human individuals.
For example, driverless cars make ethical choices during emergencies, while advanced AIalgorithms sort us as hireable or unhireable.
For Vallor, such a technological landscape complicates our ability to achieve the good life.
Part of this is due to our acute technosocial opacity—what Vallor calls the paralyzing blindness
created when one tries to account for all the complicated and diverging ways modern technology
impacts our moral choices. This is precisely why Vallor argues virtue ethics are better positioned
to address this dilemma. She argues the fixed rules and principles of other moral frameworks such
as utilitarianism or Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative can’t keep pace with all the uncertain
paths of technosocial development we’ve witnessed and will continue to witness (Vallor 2016, 7).
Virtue ethics, however, is malleable—in fact, an important feature of Vallor’s proposed
technomoral virtues is that they explicitly remain adjustable to our ever-shifting technological
landscape.
Given this landscape, she frames her technomoral virtues around increasing our chances of
flourishing in our global technosocial conditions. She identifies twelve virtues that do: honesty,
self-control, humility, justice, courage, empathy, care, civility, flexibility, perspective,
magnanimity, and technomoral wisdom. According to Vallor, our modern technological goods and
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services have complicated our cultivation for each of these. Though I will be elaborating on this
more later, what’s important to note here is that her virtue ethic system presupposes the necessary,
unavoidable role technology plays in our lives, as well as the complications they impose. This is
not to say that modern technological goods and services—nor the goods of modern personhood
which require us to access them—are incompatible with these virtues. The whole point of Vallor’s
project is to clarify how we should be using modern technological goods and services to cultivate
these virtues. For example, technomoral wisdom is the most important of Vallor’s technomoral
virtues. Technomoral wisdom refers to the general condition of well-cultivated and integrated
moral expertise that expresses all other virtues of character that we need in order to live well with
emerging technologies. In order to cultivate technomoral wisdom, one would clearly need access
to the emerging technologies they’re supposed to using virtuously (i.e. practicing technomoral
wisdom). While certain goods of modern personhood such as social media might sometimes
conflict with cultivating technomoral wisdom, this doesn’t mean social media is incompatible with
our virtues: it just means we should 1) continue cultivating technomoral wisdom so we can make
ourselves aware of how to use such goods without going against our virtues and 2) look into
changing how we regulate or design our modern technological goods and services so that they
better reflect our virtues.

CULTIVATING VIRTUES THROUGH THE GOODS OF MODERN LIFE
From healthcare to education, from social media to employment—the goods of modern life
are those goods and services which modern citizens are expected to benefit from. When we use
these goods and services, they help us fulfill our modern personhood, help us function as
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autonomous individuals in our modern era. And according to eudaimonic and technomoral virtue
ethics, access to the goods of modern life is an important part of cultivating our virtues.
Under eudaimonic virtue ethics, living virtuously means respecting and fulfilling our innate
psychological needs: autonomy, competency, and relatedness. In our modern era, each of these are
virtues are often fulfilled through the goods of modern life—which are increasingly facilitated
through modern technological goods and services. Similar to how modern technological goods and
services enable us to enjoy the goods of modern life, so do the goods of modern life enable us to
fulfill our virtue of autonomy. Having good health thanks to adequate health care, gaining
knowledge and skills through education, earning a living wage through employment—all of these
goods grant more agency to the individual enjoying them. By this, I mean that an individual is
generally able to live much more autonomously when they’re enjoying these goods. Likewise, the
virtue of relatedness (experiencing connections with others) is benefited by goods such as social
media, and the virtue of competence (exercising one’s skills in a way that contributes to one’s
society) is benefitted by goods such as the internet. That’s not to say that there aren’t other ways
to fulfill these virtues, but that such goods of modern life are increasingly if not already the primary
ways we do so.
Under technomoral virtue ethics, living virtuously means living in a way most likely to
increase our chances of flourishing in our global technosocial conditions. It is worth noting that
technomoral virtue ethics presupposes that we as modern humans will necessarily be engaging
with modern technological goods and services, and that we therefore will need to cultivate our
virtues partially through modern technological goods and services. But I argue that the goods of
life themselves also help us cultivate these virtues. After all, the whole point of Vallor’s project is
to articulate the proper way to use technology in order to cultivate technomoral virtues. Consider
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again the case of Grindr. It might seem odd to claim that accessing Grindr constitutes living
virtuously. Indeed, there might be conflict between the life we have through Grindr and living a
virtuous life—but again, that’s Vallor point: there are myriad ways modern technological goods
and services complicate our ability to live virtuously. We might use Grindr in the wrong sort of
way, but that doesn’t mean that this tool couldn’t be used in a way to cultivate our technomoral
virtues. As Vallor writes, “Why not demand useful tools that do not debilitate us?” (Vallor 2016,
169). In other words, modern technological goods and services have positive effects and negative
effects on our ability to live virtuously—why deprive ourselves of the positives if can work on
removing the negatives? In this example, it’s not that gay men require Grindr to be virtuous, but it
could very well be the case that they require something to fill the role of Grindr (perhaps another
dating app) in order to live virtuously. After all, it seems unsatisfying to try and develop the virtue
of care—defined by Vallor as “a skillful, attentive, responsible, and emotionally responsive
disposition to personally meet the needs of those with whom we share our technosocial
environment”—if you’re not even allowed to pursue a meaningful romantic relationship, let alone
communicate with someone of your own sexual identity.
Considering the role of goods of modern life serve in our cultivation of eudaimonic and
technomoral virtues, it would seem morally impermissible to decline the goods of modern life.
This is because total withdrawal from modern technological goods and services is incompatible
with cultivating our virtues, in the sense that to go without such tools is to needlessly obstruct our
ability to live virtuously. Specifically, because modern society requires us to use modern
technological goods and services to participate in various facets of society, clicking disagree would
severely hinder our ability to function autonomously. By this, I mean opting out of modern
technological goods and services would effectively restrict our freedom to the point of hindering
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our ability to experience ourselves as the source of the things we do. After all, it’s difficult to feel
like the source of the things you do if the vast majority of the things you’d want to do in modern
society is locked away from you. To be denied the goods of modern life (to lose access to modern
technological goods and services) is to then deny modern personhood. Aside from the material
loss of modern personhood (the myriad benefits spawning from goods such as but not limited to
healthcare, education, and social media), when one considers how Vallor’s technomoral virtue
ethics hinges on the fact that humanity’s modern technology is so impactful that we must reorient
our entire ethics in reckoning of this technology, then surely to be denied to partake in said
technology is to be denied being treated as human, as autonomous, as a modern individual of equal
moral consideration.
Losing the ability to cultivate our eudaimonic and technomoral virtues becomes a violation
of one’s rights because denying these virtues entails denying the fulfillment of basic human
needs—needs that we increasingly fulfill through modern technological goods and services. By
cultivating eudaimonic and technomoral virtues through these goods and services, we fulfill our
modern personhood and enjoy goods we as modern citizens know ourselves worthy of enjoying,
such as education, healthcare, and social media. Recalling the example of Grindr, to deny a queer
individual access to this service might constitute denying them the only safe way to love and
therefore fulfill their authentic selves. And keeping to our commitment to psychological realism,
it would be psychologically unrealistic for your average queer person to view the expulsion from
modern personhood (including such a service as Grindr) as anything but a harm, and for most a
particularly unbearable one at that.
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Part III: Instrumentarianism

SURVIELLANCE CAPITALISM & ITS HARMS
Modern technological goods and services operate under an exploitative, harmful economic
order best understood as surveillance capitalism. This system profoundly diminishes our privacy,
allowing others access to our autonomy through instrumentarianism. While many harms of
surveillance capitalism are generally known by the public and discussed by scholars across
disciplines, they haven’t necessarily discussed these harms in relation to our autonomy. But
because instrumentarian tools modify our thoughts and behaviors (often without our awareness),
we need to. I argue that it is through these tools that our mental wilds are cut away and our
autonomy becomes vulnerable. This directly contradicts eudaimonic and technomoral virtue
ethics. Having our autonomy disrupted and made vulnerable in such a way is to endure an
intolerable harm.
Zuboff provides eight definitions for surveillance capitalism. For the purposes of
investigating our technosocial contract, I’ve merged five of them together to provide a basic
definition of surveillance capitalism:
As the foundational framework of a surveillance economy, surveillance capitalism is the
new economic order that claims human experience as free raw material for hidden
commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales. This parasitic economic logic
subordinates the productions of goods and services in favor of a new global architecture of
behavior modification: this is the origin of instrumentarianism.
Surveillance can be broadly understood as close and sustained observation over someone
or something. This process involves a transfer of information, where the person or thing surveilling
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learns information about the person or thing surveilled—in other words, on information going out.
One of the most well-known examples of surveillance technology is the panopticon. Originally
conceived by Jeremy Bentham, the panopticon was an architectural design for prison: from the
view of a single tower, guards could peer into each prisoner’s cell. As a prisoner this meant you
could be watched at any moment, but you never knew when. Bentham originally designed the
panopticon as a tool for moral improvement—but Michel Foucault argues in his book Discipline
& Punish: The Birth of the Prison that the panopticon also functions as a tool of social control: a
subtle, persuasive, and coercive technology of people which we would now refer to as behavior
modification technology.
Surveillance technologies have advanced far beyond the sort of surveillance described by
the panopticon. This is because various technological innovations have made it possible to extract
more information through surveillance than ever before. These developments are generally
understood in three ways: 1) as powerful improvements in existing technologies12 which therefore
improve the quality of information extracted, 2) as the massive expansion of digital technologies13
across the globe through which surveillance technologies may be applied, and 3) as developments
in the ability store and process extracted information. This includes our increasingly powerful and
opaque tools of analysis. These third type of innovations are the technologies that I and others refer
to when we talk about others knowing more about us than we know ourselves. This usually
involves analyzing metadata—data about data sets. For example, modeling involves the analysis
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For example, advances in digital photography make it possible to read and even clone
fingerprints from photos only showing parts of someone’s hands (Wood 2018, para. 21).
13
Such technologies are becoming increasingly invisible in the world around us. As Google CEO
Eric Schmidt acknowledges, the most profound technologies are those that disappear—that weave
themselves into the fabric of everyday life so they are indistinguishable from it, allowing devices
like computers to vanish into the background (Zuboff 2019, 98).
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of aggregated data sets and generates information about people beyond what is given in the
induvial data sets. “Likes” on Facebook are sufficient to accurately predict sexual orientation,
ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive
substances, parental separation, age, and gender—a stunning tool that is able to identify
psychological traits “as accurately as a psychologist administering a standardized, validated
instrument” (Tufekci 2014, para. 35). Meanwhile, researchers using facial recognition technology
concluded that deep neural networks could detect sexual orientation from faces with around 80%
accuracy—besting the judgement of humans (Wang and Kosinski 2017, 2).14 And thanks to
advances in DNA analysis and popular commercial practices that collect biometric information,
individuals disclosing their genetic information also disclose the genetic data of their family
members, past and present. This is particularly worrying as it is not only impossible for those not
yet born to consent to their genetic data being extracted, but it could be potentially damaging for
such information to be known by potential employers or others who might use this information
against them.
The introduction of instrumentarian tools further encouraged developments of this third
type, with new methods such as affective computing, emotion analytics, and sentiment analysis
being created to render both our conscious and unconscious emotion as observable behavior.
Affective computing refers to systems and devices that recognize, interpret, process, and simulate
human affects. Emotion and sentiment analytics use data about a person’s verbal or nonverbal
communication to learn their mood or attitude. All three entail sensitive information and personal
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This technology poses a massive and immediate threat to queer individuals across the globe,
specifically in areas where being queer is outlawed and punishable by death.
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data one otherwise might not broadcast being derived from seemingly innocuous bits of data, such
as but not limited to tweets, selfies, and the tone of our voice.
In America, concerns over surveillance are traditionally concerns over government
surveillance. An interesting contrast can be found in China. While the Chinese government
controls its surveillance technologies and instrumentarian tools, corporations are the ones who
control these in America and in much of the Western world. This doesn’t mean American citizens
are any better off when it comes this imbalance of power, as Zuboff writes: “No other time in
history have private corporations of unprecedented wealth and power enjoyed the free exercise of
economies of action supported by a pervasive global architecture of ubiquitous computational
knowledge and control constructed and maintained by the advanced scientific know-how that
money can buy” (Zuboff 2019, 308). The degree to which corporations surveil us has only recently
breached public awareness. Zuboff credits the dawn of surveillance capitalism to America’s
reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the neoliberal policies advanced between Google and
intelligence agencies.15 Specifically, she pinpoints Google’s invention of targeted advertising for
not only paving the way to Google’s financial success and current technological dominance, but
as the origin point for the economic imperative that our personal data be rendered as raw material
for hidden practices of prediction, sales, and influence. These events created a doctrine she calls
surveillance exceptionalism, which can roughly be understood as the political belief that
surveillance for the sake of safety is not only acceptable, but the correct thing to do in response to
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Following the events of 9/11 politicians quickly passed the Patriot Act, which among other
things diluted judicial oversight in invading the privacy of civilians. Additionally, the US
government went on to advocate for the intentional inclusion of exploits into American technology
and infrastructure, just for the sake of surveillance—despite the fact these exploits could also be
used by hackers or other nefarious actors (Snowden 2019, 194). In fact, CIA Director Hayden
admitted that during the years following 9/11 America could be fairly charged with the
militarization of the world wide web (Zuboff 2019, 114).
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threats such as terrorism. What followed was a mutually beneficial arrangement: user data gave
corporations vast profits, and the government could pilfer this data for free. This collaboration
between Google and the NSA was unprecedented. As time went on, the gap between privacy
protections against surveillance by the governmental and privacy protections against surveillance
by corporations only widened. Surveillance capitalists (those profiting off the sale of our extracted
information or by selling access to us through instrumentarian tools) engineered sophisticated
multi-state-level lobbying campaigns to fight back against any proposed legislation that would
augment our privacy or curtail their behavioral data surplus operations.
All of these converging technological developments that constitute surveillance capitalism
and its new instrumentarian power warrant more examination than I will pursue for my analysis
of our technosocial contract, but here I shall briefly clarify the general process of how surveillance
capitalism operates:
1) When we engage with modern technological goods and services, our human
experiences are claimed as free raw material by corporations. By human experiences,
I’m referring to the personal data created when we interact with these technologies,
such as one’s location, the contents of an email or text, or audio and visual recordings
both passively and actively collected by our devices. Various converging technological
innovations have amplified the quantity and quality of information that can be extracted
from this material. More surveillance means more data, and more data means more
material—this created the extraction imperative, which holds that raw-material
supplies must be procured at an ever-expanding scale.
2) These materials are fed through machine intelligence technologies which translate into
behavioral data surplus. Such technologies are currently kept as corporate trade secrets.
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Behavioral data surplus refers to information not related to the use of a product or
service that is then used to predict the future behavior of the person this data is extracted
from. Corporations use this data to improve their tools of instrumentarianism—such as
Facebook using this data to train their facial recognition technology and Google using
this data to train their AI.16 These instrumentarian tools are also kept as corporate trade
secrets by tech companies. Additionally, they use this behavioral surplus data to
produce prediction products designed to forecast what we will feel, think, and do in the
future, and then sell these prediction products to advertisers and other interested third
parties on behavioral future markets. Under surveillance capitalism, selling these
prediction products (aided by instrumentarian tools) is far more lucrative than selling
goods or services to customers.
3) Better predictions mean more profits—this created the prediction imperative, the
realization that the best way to predict an outcome was to guarantee that outcome. This
led to aggressive economies of scope and action. Economies of scope refers to
operations pushing beyond the virtual world in order to mine behavioral surplus data
from the “real” world (such as devices unnecessarily installed17 with Wi-Fi and
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Google’s machine intelligence capabilities feed on behavioral surplus, and the more surplus they
consume, the more accurate their prediction result. This leads some such as investigative reporter
Kevin Kelly to conclude that “it’s more likely that Google develops Search as a means of
continuously training its evolving AI capabilities” (Zuboff 2019, 95).
17
Devices like smartphones, smart TVs, smart fridges—the use of “smart” here is just one example
in a long history of corporations attempting to rebrand surveillance in a positive light. Addiction
to screens is labelled “user engagement” while techniques designed to tamper with your unique
mind is called “personalization”—as Véliz writes: “Tech has gone so far in seducing us through
words that it has even sequestered the language of nature … you used to be able to taste the
sweetness of an apple, listen to bird tweet at sunrise, wade your feet into a stream, and find shapes
in the clouds passing by … now these words are mostly used to describe things that are the opposite
of nature” (Véliz 2020, 64).
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analytics focused on uncovering intimate patterns of the self). In other words, this
imperative creates an economic logic to maximize the territory (physical or mental)
which can be surveilled. Economies of action refers to the tools of instrumentarianism:
technologies designed to intervene and shape our behavior in order to better their own
predictions. In other words, this imperative creates an economic logic which views
autonomy (protected by our privacy) as a threat to profits.18 For surveillance capitalism,
our ability to resist its undue influence is unacceptable.
But before I elaborate further on the tools of instrumentarianism and how this threatens our
autonomy, I want to describe some of the general harms produced by surveillance capitalism.
It’s first worth clarifying how surveillance technologies functioning under surveillance
capitalism generally harm our privacy and autonomy. For example, one might wonder how
surveillance technologies could impact our autonomy if we’re unaware we’re being surveilled and
therefore unaware our privacy is being invaded. The reason why our autonomy is still diminished
in such a case is because surveillance involves a transfer of information: the observer learns
something about the observed. Even in the case where the observed is a person walking down the
street and the observer is a security camera, the security camera receives information about the
person walking by—the person’s privacy is reduced as the security camera records information
about them, information which can then be used to exert undue influence over their autonomy. In
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Although surveillance capitalists often claim objectivity and neutrality when using tools of
instrumentarianism, research shows that manipulations to algorithms by Facebook and Google
continue to reflect corporate commercial objectives—as legal scholar Frank Pasquale describes it:
“The power to include, exclude, and rank is the power to ensure which public impressions become
permanent and which remain fleeting … They help create the world they claim to merely ‘show’
us” (Pasquale 2015, 60).
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other words, surveillance technologies inevitably impact our autonomy because privacy is a
necessary condition for autonomy.
Another important clarification regarding surveillance capitalism and its general harms to
our privacy and autonomy is how the attainment of data farmed from an open source or public
venue can still constitute an invasion of privacy and threat to autonomy. Reconsider the security
camera and the person walking down the street—at first glance, it might seem unreasonable to
claim that the security camera is invading the person’s privacy since the person is out in public.
One might argue that personal data collected in such spaces isn’t problematic because this data
appears to be freely given, and there is also a limit to how much personal data can be expected to
remain private when participating in such spaces.
Yet there are many ways surveillance capitalism complicates this scenario. It should be
recalled that the surveillance technologies deployed across our public venues are now capable of
extracting information which we justifiably expect to remain private, even in public venues. For
example, if the security camera in this scenario is equipped with the appropriate AI-facial
recognition software, then the security camera could determine the sexuality of the person walking
down the street. Although there are many ways for someone’s sexuality to become known, merely
showing one’s face in public shouldn’t be one of them; security cameras learning the sexualities
of passersby would appear to constitute an invasion of privacy.
Furthermore, considering our new definition of privacy—privacy as protection from
external influences—then the collection of personal data from open sources qualifies as a
problematic breach of privacy. The tools of instrumentarianism which allow others to access our
autonomy directly relies on our personal data, including personal data available through open
sources. We might not object to someone googling their classmate to learn what they can about
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them, but we would object to someone surveilling their classmate to the degree our modern
technological goods and services surveil us. Recall how recent technological innovations have
created the ability to extract new information by analyzing metadata. If someone was using these
tools of analysis to extract new and profound personal data from existing personal data about their
classmate online, then (thanks to the tools of instrumentarianism) they’re also extracting the
resources to exert undue influence over them. Because instrumentarianism grants others access to
our autonomy—and because this access is achieved through the loss of our privacy—then the
attainment of such data remains problematic, even when this data originally derives from an open
source.
There are many harms to such a system, but there are two ways surveillance capitalism
proves exploitative that I wish to highlight. The first way surveillance capitalism appears
exploitative to potentially intolerable degrees is what Zuboff refers to as the unauthorized
privatization of the division of learning. She argues that surveillance capitalism shifted the
ordering principle of the workplace from a division of labor to a division of learning—we conquer
new intellectual skills and learn to thrive in our information-rich environments, but there’s deep
conflicts of knowledge, authority, and power (Zuboff 2019, 180). One way to understand these
conflicts is through problem of two texts. There are the public facing texts (our screens) which
we’re the authors and readers of, and then there’s the shadow text (what’s behind our screens)—a
burgeoning accumulation of behavioral surplus and its analyses which says more about us than we
know about ourselves. This shadow text automatically feeds on our experience as we engage in
the normal and necessary routines of social participation. This a severe asymmetry in knowledge—
after all, those who are surveilled (customers, citizens, students and teachers, employees) are
excluded from the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge found in this shadow text and lack
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any means within this distribution of learning to challenge this asymmetry. Another way to
understand this asymmetry of knowledge is to understand that knowledge is a form of power. Other
philosophers have discussed surveillance capitalism in these terms—the thesis of Véliz’s book is
that privacy functions as a form of power, and that the ability to forecast and influence people
based off their personal data is “the quintessential kind of power” in the digital age (Véliz 2020,
53). Drawing from Michel Foucault’s theories on how there is power in knowing and knowledge
in power19, Véliz points out that power constructs human subjects, saying: “The more someone
knows about us, the more they anticipate our every move, as well as influence us … power
generates certain mentalities, it transforms sensitives, it brings about ways of being in the world”
(Véliz 2020, 52). And if knowledge (and privacy) is power, then surveillance capitalists are
extracting the most potent and distilled form of this power: intimate knowledge about yourself that
you yourself are unaware of. For example, if you’re uncertain about your religious beliefs, sexual
orientation, or political leaning—chances are your consumer profile is certain. And while it might
be fine for more to be known about you than you know about yourself, it doesn’t seem fine for
corporations to hunt, extract, and commodify this information—let alone immediately weaponize
it against you by trying to exert undue influence over you through tools of instrumentarianism.
The fact that surveillance capitalism forces us to relinquish such power in order to access the goods
and services we need just to function as modern citizens is exploitative to a degree we can
justifiably view as unacceptable.
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Indeed, according to Foucault, “We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power
in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’.
In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.
The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault
1995, 194).
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The other way surveillance capitalism is exploitative that I want to highlight is how this
system amounts to outright theft. This theft can be thought of as digital dispossession, the seizure
of our human experience as material for surveillance capitalism’s market mechanisms—Zuboff
credits this original act of seizure as the originating point for surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2019,
99). What results is a profound disruption in the historical consumer and product dynamic. Because
corporations make more money selling access to us, it is more accurate to refer to advertisers and
other actors purchasing this access as the actual customers, while we are more like something
farmed. The ‘product’ of value in this exchange is the behavioral data surplus that is ripped from
our lives. As Zuboff phrases it, “You are not the product, you are the abandoned carcass” (Zuboff
2019, 377). Furthermore, this has severe repercussions for society as we know it. Whereas before
capitalism’s cycle of supply and demand catered to the genuine needs of populations and societies
and enabled the fruitful expansion of market democracy, surveillance capitalism no longer has any
direct connection or interest in the needs of populations, societies, or states. This shift is extremely
worrying and underscores the degree to which surveillance capitalism has rewritten the rules of
our society.
Of the many harms surveillance capitalism produces, there are myriad material harms we
endure through our diminished privacy. By material harms, I refer to harms which seem
unobjectively harmful to an individual’s ability to function in modern society. For example, in her
book Weapons of Math Destruction, Cathy O’Neil details the proliferation of problematic
mathematical machine-powered models which increasingly manage our lives. These predictive
models often encode human prejudice, misunderstanding, and bias into their software (O’Neil
2016, 3). They also require our privacy (our personal data) to function, and are everywhere in
fields such as human resources, healthcare, and banking. These digital models produce tangible
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harms. For example, a growing number of employers use wellness programs to surveil employees
via health devices such as Fitbits and Apple Watches. After processing their personal data, an
employee’s health insurance premium goes up or down (O’Neil 2016, 175). Similarly, it is
common practice for employers to demand a potential employee’s credit card data before hiring
them. This is thought to weed out individuals who are unscrupulous or untrustworthy—but this
also acts as a dangerous poverty cycle (O’Neill 2016, 148). After all, how can one climb out of
debt if they can’t earn the funds to do so? In other cases, an employer may not hire you because
their models have discovered you have a mental illness based on how you answered their survey
(O’Neil 2016, 106).20 Meanwhile, these models help ads pinpoint people in great need to sell them
false or overpriced promises. For example, in training materials for recruiters at Vatterott College,
they were explicit about preying upon those in pain, with one slide depicting “an image of a dentist
bearing down on a patient in agony, with the words: Find Out Where Their Pain Is” (O’Neill 2016,
73). The point of this message and image (and the whole presentation) was to emphasize how
recruiters need to find prospective students’ psychological vulnerabilities (their “pain”) in order to
better lure them into attending Vatterott College.
Another material harm worth noting is the perpetuation of inequality. As previous
mentioned, some of these new technologies unintentionally encode human prejudice,
misunderstanding, and bias into their software systems. One way this manifests is through
predictive policing. Through predictive policing, officers use surveillance and data-mining tools
to predict and preempt criminal activity. This is especially worrying, as racial bias within the
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As O’Neil writes: “Consider the feedback loop that the Kronos personality test engenders …
red-lighting people with certain mental health issues prevents them from having a normal job and
leading a normal life, further isolating them ... this is exactly what the Americans with
Disabilities Act is supposed to prevent” (O’Neil 2016, 112).
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American criminal justice system is a well-known problem. In fact, Simone Browne argues in her
book Dark Matters that surveillance has always been used to reinforce racial hierarchies in the US
by regulating blackness. Considering how developing technologies continue to be racially
designed we are right to worry about tactics such as preemptive policing.21 Also referred to as
“predictive policing”, this practice involves advanced algorithms trying to predict potential crimes,
victims, and offenders based on previous data. In theory this enhances public safety, but in effect
this reinforces institutional biases. This is partially due to biased data being fed into these
algorithms which then produces biased outcomes. According to various studies, such predictive
policing systems exacerbate racial discrimination in our criminal justice system (Crawford et al
2019, 193).
We are also right to worry about how our modern technological goods and services
disproportionately levy harms against minority identities, and how at the very least surveillance
capitalism provides tools ripe to exploit and harm minority identities. Another way to understand
the fundamental inequality imposed by this system is through how personal data operates. In fact,
this leads Véliz to view privacy as justice’s blindfold: that which blinds the system to ensure we
are all treated equally. As she writes:
The very essence of the personal data economy is that we are all treated differently,
according to our data. It is because we are treated differently that algorithms end up being
sexist and racist … it is because we are treated differently on account of our data that

21

As Snowden quips: “No policing algorithm would ever be programmed, even if it could be,
toward leniency or forgiveness …. A world in which every law is always enforced would be a
world in which everyone was criminal,” (Snowden 2019, 197). I agree with Snowden in that, in
addition to the problematic convergence of racist policing practices and powerful surveillance
technologies, there seems something fundamentally intolerable about every law being
automatically enforced. It could be said that there is a certain beauty in slight, non-harming acts of
deviancy—perhaps a flash of wild.
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different people get to pay different prices for the same product without knowing they
might be paying more than others. It is because we are treated differently that we get to see
different content, which further amplifies our differences—a vicious cycle of otherness and
inequality. No matter who you are, you should have the same access to information and
opportunities (p. 86).
Véliz goes on to argue that personal data is so toxic that we should ban the trade in it altogether,
just as we ban other trades (the buying and selling of people, votes, organs, etc.) we deem too
harmful to be legal. Indeed, there does seem to be certain types of knowledge that we would find
inherently wrong for someone to profit off of; it strikes us as gross and unethical for someone to
profit off the knowledge that someone’s loved one just died in a car accident. She makes a
convincing case for this in her book, but for the purposes of investigating our technosocial contract
we can for now just acknowledge that surveillance capitalism perpetuates discrimination and
inequality in a way we have good reason to worry about.
Another worry many have with surveillance capitalism is its apparent threat to democracy.
This is traditionally understood in two ways: 1) destabilizing the autonomy of citizens and 2)
further bolstering corporation’s power over democratic governments. As previously discussed,
privacy is necessary for autonomy. Autonomy is widely accepted as a necessary component to
democracy: any self-governing polity depends on individuals having autonomy, otherwise it’s not
meaningfully self-governed. This has led philosophers such Dorota Mokrosinska to argue that
privacy serves as a social good: we are collectively interested in each other’s privacy just as we
are collectively interested in each other’s autonomy. A good example of this is psycho-political
metamorphosis. This is the term for Jeffrey Reiman gives for how our modern technological
infrastructure problematizes our political autonomy: when we’re surveilled like this, this stunts not
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only our actions but how we reason, pushing us towards conventionally or a “happy medium”
rather than thoughts that go against acceptable political thinking (Nissenbaum 2010, 76). Reiman
regards our modern technological infrastructure as an informational panopticon. He reimagines
Bentham’s panoptic prison as a fishbowl, where people are visible from a single point. He argues
this produces risks of extrinsic and intrinsic losses of freedom, as well as risks to our political
autonomy. Consider self-censorship. Self-censorship isn’t inherently bad, but it’s worrying when
people self-censor in ways that damage their autonomy. As Véliz writes, “When you don’t search
for a term for fear of how others might use that information about you, your autonomy and freedom
are being limited” (Véliz 2020, 72). We might not care if the term being searched is something we
wouldn’t want someone searching in the first place, such as child pornography. But when googling
becomes a means to form identity—perhaps a user is researching about different sexualities,
political views, or religious convictions—then we do care if someone can search these terms
without the looming threat of negative repercussions preventing them from doing so. Especially if
they’re googling alternative political thinking.
Furthermore, because instrumentarianism uses our diminished privacy to disrupt our
autonomy, we have reason to worry that instrumentarian tools could be used to influence people
to vote not because of their deepest convictions but because these tools manipulated their
perceptions and beliefs. Political campaigns have always targeted key voters and tried to persuade
them to their side, just as politicians have always presented themselves differently depending on
who they’re speaking to.22 What is new and concerning about these tactics now is that our modern
technological infrastructure might push these practices too far. For example, an important feature
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Common and often humorous examples of this are when politicians adopt different accents
depending on which region of the country they’re visiting.
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of democracy is the ability for two opposing sides to agree on a basic set of facts that they can
debate from. When political messaging and campaigns use tools of instrumentarianism, they are
violating the spirit of our democracy: we want politicians portraying the same thing to all
prospective voters, because this not only helps promote coherent debates between those of
opposing sides, but it helps hold politicians accountable. The worry here is that surveillance
capitalism will continue to worsen the inability for two opposing sides to share a common reality,
and that instrumentarian tools could potentially manipulate a voter’s views of a politician such that
they are voting for or against someone based on a totally inaccurate understanding of them. Again,
this isn’t necessarily new, but what is new is the degree to which instrumentarian tools perfect this
practice. In other words, we accept that a certain amount of persuasion is okay for politicians to
engage in, but instrumentarianism might push this persuasion into outright manipulation.
The other way surveillance capitalism threatens democracy is through worsening the evergrowing imbalance between governmental and corporate power. According to Zuboff, surveillance
capitalism rose to dominance in the US during conditions of relative lawlessness—meaning little
to no regulation existed to curtail corporate practices such as claiming our human experience as
free raw material for commercial ends or implementing tools of instrumentarianism throughout
our digital economy. Furthermore, the organic reciprocity that exists in relationships between
people as either consumers or employees is lost in this exchange; again, we are more like
something harvested from. This is simply not the sort of relationship we want between the union
of market capitalism and democracy because this prioritizes the needs of advertisers and other
third-party actors (the actual customers in this exchange) over the needs of citizens (those
harvested from). It is worth noting that in 2016 almost half of all donations to both political parties
($176 million) came from a small group of wealthy individuals and their corporations (Zuboff
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2019, 43). Google and other surveillance capitalist corporations like Facebook lead aggressive
lobbying campaigns against any efforts to regulate their practices or diminish their access to our
personal data. Then add to this the fact that surveillance capitalists control the accumulation and
processing of information about our behavior—and that we remain in the dark about the processes
through which they understand our behavior as well as the exact knowledge gained in doing so—
then we have good reason to worry that surveillance capitalism will only bolster corporate power
over governments.
As Véliz puts it, “Having one of the most powerful corporations in the world know so much
about us and allowing it to show us messages that can influence our voting behavior during
elections is insane” (Véliz 2020, 105). It is insane because the rule of law cannot rely on good faith
alone. We currently lack meaningful checks and balances against corporations doing the sorts of
things we don’t want them to do (such as deploying instrumentarian tools to manipulate voting
outcomes). Our autonomy, as well as our democracy, should not be something we can only just
trust that corporations will protect and not exploit.23 We don’t want corporations monopolizing
public utilities like water and electricity—the same can be said for social media and other modern
technological goods and services. We don’t want corporations monopolizing our means of social
connection. Currently, corporations monopolize what is becoming an increasingly popular
language: emojis. Emojis (short for emoticon) are visual representations of emotions, objects, or
symbols used across digital mediums. Not only are they extremely popular (now even appearing
in news headlines and political announcements) but some have speculated whether a future global
language would come from emojis: many “words” such as a smiley face have multi-lingual aspects
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Indeed, if corporations’ handling of our natural wilds is any indication, then we have good reason
to believe they will not only fail to protect our mental wilds but actively cause their destruction.
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to them, rendering them comprehensible across languages. So far, the Oxford Dictionary named
the “Face with Tears of Joy” emoji as the Word of the Year for 2015, while some studies estimate
that more than 90% of users social networking communicate with emojis (Zareen et al 2016, 257).
If emojis continue to grow in popularity or do indeed become a useful global language, then we
should worry about corporations retaining complete control over this language; a language is
something we shouldn’t want corporations monopolizing. Whereas before words were something
defined and revised by people over time, now it is corporations who we rely on to define and revise
this language. We have no means to tweak emojis, let alone upload our own to use. If a government
prevented citizens from revising, creating, or using words of their own design in this way, we
would call this government totalitarian. Likewise, we should regard corporations monopolizing an
entire branch of language with equal scrutiny.
The final harm I want to touch upon is the profound impact modern technological goods
and services appear to have on our mental health—notably on the mental health of younger
generations. First and foremost, it’s worth recalling a major point in eudaimonic ethics: that our
innate psychological needs are as vital to our psychological health as our biological needs are vital
to our biological health. Autonomy is one of our most important psychological needs. Because
interacting with modern technological goods and services necessarily diminishes our privacy and
features instrumentarian tools that use this decline in our privacy to disrupt our autonomy, it is
perhaps understandable why we’re seeing such poor mental health from those that interact with
modern technological goods and services the most. Especially if we recall how Besser-Jones
stresses that empirical research shows that matters is if we’re having autonomous experiences or
not, regardless of if we’re conscious of having them or not. In this sense, we could be thinking
we’re acting autonomously when engaging with a specific instrumentarian tool, but if we’re not
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actually functioning autonomously enough in this exchange, then we won’t actually be fulfilling
our psychological need for autonomy.
A good example of such a tool are smartphones. 95% of Generation Z use smartphones,
and a similar amount use social media (Watson 2018, para. 2). For better or worse, smartphones
are iconic of not only our modern age but also of millennials and Gen Z: they use them the most,
and they are the first generations who used them during their formative years of childhood,
adolescence, and young adulthood. They are also unquestionably one of the most powerful
vehicles for instrumentarianism in our modern age: as digital signals monitor and track our daily
activities, a company may gradually “master the schedule of reinforcements—rewards,
recognition, or praise that can reliably produce the specific user behaviors that the company selects
for dominance” (Zuboff 2019, 295).
Young people are especially vulnerable to instrumentarian tools on social media. This is
because young people are still going through the developmental processes that build individual
identity and personal autonomy. In one international study of media use by youth that spanned ten
countries and five continents, participants were asked to abstain from all digital media for only
twenty-four hours—what emerged was “a planet-wide gnashing of teeth and tearing of flesh that
even the study’s directors found disquieting” (Zuboff 2019, 445). Specifically, researchers found
that participants experienced a range of emotional distress summarized into six categories:
addiction, failure to unplug, boredom, confusion, distress, and isolation. Sudden disconnection
from social media had produced the kinds of cravings, depression, and anxiety which are
characteristic of clinically diagnosed addictions. Scholars such as Zuboff, Vallor, and Véliz argue
that addiction is a core design of apps. CEOs have admitted as much. As Suhail Doshi of Mixpanel
(an analytics firm that sells tools for measuring user interactions to developers) wrote in a post
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titled “Mixpanel: How Addictive is Your App?”: “Social apps have a stable, consistent and
thoroughly addicted user base, with 50 percent of people engaging with social networks for more
than five hours a day, and even a small percentage logging time during every waking hour,” (Doshi
2014, para. 3). Again, this is especially troubling for young people, who are still developing their
capacities for self-control.24 Furthermore, social media relies heavily on constant comparisons,
with users often judging themselves against idealized versions of the lives and bodies of others.
This leads people to know themselves from ‘the outside looking in’—to understand themselves in
virtue of how others see them. The more the need for the ‘others’ is fed, the less one is able to
negotiate the work of self-construction—this failure to attain positive equilibrium between inner
and outer life is so devastating that psychologists Daniel Lapsley and Ryan Woodbury argue it is
‘at the heart’ of most adult personality disorders (Woodbury et al 2016, 152). This cycle of
comparison and obsessing over perfection is part of the magnetic pull that social media exerts on
young people, which drives them toward more automatic and less voluntary behavior, and “for too
many, that behavior shades into the territory of genuine compulsion” (Zuboff 2019, 449). In
particular, Zuboff credits Facebook for excelling in this strategy, writing:
Facebook is the crucible of this new dark science. It aims to perfect the relentless
stimulation of social comparison in which natural empathy is manipulated and
instrumentalized to modify behavior toward others’ ends. This synthetic hive is a
devilish pact for a young person. In terms of sheer everyday effectiveness—contact,

24

The addictive power smartphones hold over us is a subject depicted by many artists and
storytellers—as one song goes: “I try to pull the curtains back / Turn you off, but can’t detach /
When all I want and all I know / Is time spent looking at my phone” (Goldwasser and
VanWyngarden, 2018, track 5). It is also interesting to note that the creator of popular sci-fi horror
Netflix series Black Mirror named his show after what screens look like when they’re turned off
(Rowney 2018, para. 6).
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logistics, transactions, communications—turn away, and you are lost. And if you
simply crave the fusion juice that is proof of life at a certain age and stage—turn
away, and you are extinguished (p. 468).
Only time will tell the full effects of generations growing up in such digital environments25—but
for now, there appears to be real and tangible harms to our mental health when we engage with
modern technological goods and services such as social media.
All these are serious harms worthy of more attention than they are given. Yet we endure
these and much more when we use modern technological goods and services to access our modern
personhood. For when we click agree, we’re entering an exploitative system best described as
surveillance capitalism, and are harmed by doing so. These harms directly inhibit our ability to
enjoy modern lives—whether if it’s being flagged by a racist algorithm or being denied a job
because your credit score is too low. And especially during our hyper-connected modernity, where
our personal data is being used to try to influence us on every screen we look at, never before have
we needed to rely on our autonomy to defend against being manipulated for others’ ends.

INSTRUMENTARIANISM & IT’S TOOLS
To enjoy our modern personhood, we are increasingly required to use modern
technological goods and services. When we do so, corporations sell access to our autonomy to
advertisers and other interested third parties. They do this through a new form of power Zuboff
calls instrumentarianism—the power to know and shape human behavior toward other’s ends.
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Zuboff repeatedly refers to growing up in such environments as growing up in a ‘machine
hive’—the term ‘hive’ here draws echoes to Reiman’s ‘fishbowl’ informational panopticon.
Indeed, playing with this these terms further, one might come to understand social media as a sort
of pleasurable prison for young people—a hive, sweet and alluring, but inevitably unfulfilling.
After all, only one bee has true autonomy: the queen, who orchestrates the rest of her subjects.
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instrumentation
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instrumentalization of behavior for the purposes of modification, prediction, monetization, and
control, Zuboff also thought of this phrase in the form of puppetry, writing: “In this formulation,
‘instrumentation’ refers to the puppet: the ubiquitous connected material architecture of sensate
computation that renders, interprets, and actuates human experience” (Zuboff 2019, 376). In our
modern technological infrastructure, the knowing component to this power refers to how
corporations surveil us, while the shaping component to this power refers to how corporations use
tools of instrumentarianism if exert undue influence over us. Converging technological
innovations have dramatically increased what all can be known from the information extracted
through surveillance, while developments in behavior modification technologies have dramatically
increased the effectiveness of behaviors being shaped. The existing tools of instrumentarianism
appear to be successful enough to at the very least be problematic, and without any regulation on
these tools or the power behind them we have good reason to worry about how these tools will
develop in the near future.
The tools of instrumentarianism exist through the ubiquitous digital apparatus supporting
our modern technological goods and services. Through this apparatus, instrumentarian tools
render, monitor, compute, and modify our behavior. Current tools of instrumentarianism include
tuning, herding, and conditioning. Tuning is when micro-interventions occur to one’s choice
architecture: the ways in which situations are already structured to channel attention and shape
behavior. A classic example are social media feeds, where corporations decide what posts are
prioritized, which photos are highlighted and which news articles you’ll encounter while scrolling.
Also called nudging, tuning often operates outside of our awareness. Herding involves controlling
key elements in a person’s immediate context. Under surveillance capitalism, this could look like
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a car manufacturer shutting down a driver’s car remotely because the driver’s late on their car
insurance payments. This foreclose of action alternative moves behavior along heightened
probability akin to certainty: the driver must drive, after all. Conditioning is the process through
which specific behavior is shaped with the application of negative and positive reinforcements. As
previously mentioned, smartphones appear to be the primary vehicle for this sort of
instrumentarian tool. All three of these tools existed before surveillance capitalism, but what makes
these tools so powerful now is the degree to which they’re able to know our behavior due to our
diminished privacy through surveillance technologies, and the degree to which they’re able to
shape our behavior due to both how saturated our digital economy is with these tools and our
dependency on modern technological goods and services which force us to interact with these tools
on a daily basis. As one of the senior software engineers Zuboff interviewed describes it: “It’s no
longer about ubiquitous computing, now the real aim is ubiquitous intervention, action, and control
… the real power is that now you can modify real-time actions in the real world … real-time
analytics translate into real-time action” (Zuboff 2019, 292).
How effective are our current tools of instrumentarianism? Enough to warrant serious
concern. Thus far, they’ve been effective enough to convince advertisers to spend millions upon
millions of dollars for them. So effective, in fact, that these revenues made corporations like
Google and Facebook some of the most powerful corporations in the world. Digital nudging for
the sake of commercial interests appears to be effective at complicating at least some amount of
customer autonomy: as one chief data scientist for a drugstore chain put it: “You can make people
do things with this technology … even if it’s just 5% of people, you’ve made 5% percent of people
do an action they otherwise wouldn’t have done, so to some extent there is an element of the user’s
loss of self-control” (Zuboff 2019, 294). And in 2012, Facebook released results from an
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experiment their users to see how effective tuning could be at increasing voter turnout. They
concluded that social messaging was indeed an effective means of tuning behavior at scale because
“it directly influenced political self-expression, information seeking, and real-world voting
behavior of millions of people”—specifically, they calculated that their manipulated social
messages sent 60,000 additional voters to the polls in the 2010 midterm election, as well as another
280,000 who cast votes as a result of the “social contagion” effect produced by the tools of
instrumentarianism (Zuboff 2019, 299). In the wake of these results, Jonathan Zittrain
acknowledged that it’s now possible to imagine Facebook quietly engineering26 an election, using
means that its users could neither detect nor control (Zuboff 2019, 300). The “social contagion”
effect from this study echoes another experiment Facebook conducted on its users. By
manipulating the extent to which people were exposed to certain emotional expressions in their
news feed, researchers concluded that emotional states can be transferred to others via emotional
contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions without their awareness (Zuboff 2019,
302). It is worth noting that these sorts of experiments are a huge problem: because it is a
corporation, Facebook avoids legal standards that academic or governmental researchers are held
too. This is what allowed Facebook to experiment on the psychologies of approximately 61 million
people without their consent. Add to this that what’s being experimented on is voter turnout and
user emotions, and these experiments appear profoundly unethical. Part of what allows Facebook
such effective emotional manipulation is how much they know about us: an internal document
acquired by the Australian press in May 2017 revealed that Facebook was able to target the precise
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It is worth noting that corporations are not the only actors manufacturing reality through modern
technological goods and services. There have been multiple instances of fake accounts organizing
real-world events such as protests and counter protests. In May of 2017, Facebook had to remove
roughly 30 real-world events that were organized in this way (Frenkel 2018, para. 7).
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moment when users felt nervous, stressed, defeated, silly, or useless—a good thing for Facebook
to know, as it is in these moments that we’re much more vulnerable to Facebook’s tools of
instrumentarianism (Zuboff 2019, 304).
A key element to Facebook and other corporations’ implementation of instrumentarian
tools like tuning, herding, and conditioning is the fact that so much of this process takes place
without our awareness. This is because awareness is linked to our autonomy; there is no
autonomous judgement without awareness because awareness is a necessary condition for the
motivation of cognitive and existential resources, according to theorists Dylan Wagner and Tod
Heatherton. They argue that the primary purpose of self-awareness is to enable self-regulation
(Zuboff 2019, 307). Regulating our thoughts, emotions, and desires is key to human autonomy.
Others, such as researchers at Cambridge University, argue that the single most important
determinant of one’s ability to resist persuasion is the ability to premeditate, to self-regulate and
chart one’s own course (Zuboff 2019, 307). This ability conflicts with the goals of surveillance
capitalism and its tools of instrumentarianism. Simply put, the more autonomous we are the more
we are able to resist the practices which make surveillance capitalists’ corporations so rich.
It remains to be seen how instrumentarian tools will develop in the future. Currently, little
to no regulation exists to curtail how these technologies are developed or deployed. Corporations
have proven quite effective at lobbying against such legislation, just as they have proven quite
effective at labeling how exactly these technologies work and all that they’re able to know and
shape as patentable trade secrets. If surveillance capitalism is logically compelled to diminish our
privacy as much as possible so as to effectively deploy, develop, and perfect tools of
instrumentarianism—and there appears to be no meaningful way to hinder them—then we have
no reason to think the progression of these tools will stop. And because we as customers are less
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valuable than others’ predictions about our future behavior, corporations are financially compelled
to pursue these tools in order to produce predictions as accurate as possible—thereby making them
financially compelled to control us as much as possible to realize their own predictions. Baked
into the logic of surveillance capitalists is their alleged right to modify others’ behavior for profit
according to methods that bypass human awareness, individual decision rights, and the entire
complex of self-regulatory processes that we can otherwise understand as our autonomy, our
experiencing ourselves as the source of the things we do. So far, this declaration has gone
unchallenged. Rosalind Picard says the goal of emotion analytics is to render both conscious and
unconscious emotion as observable behavior for coding and calculation (Zuboff 2019, 285).
Considering how facial recognition software is now capable of detecting one’s sexuality, this goal
seems plausible.
All of this seems to suggest an extremely worrying future, especially in regard to how
surveillance capitalism has restructured our society (i.e. division of learning, the disruption of
traditional consumer-product dynamics). Political theorist Hannah Arendt predicted this future
decades ago when we began conceiving of our thoughts and our brain as electronic instruments.
According to Arendt, the problem with the theories of behaviorism which support these tools isn’t
that they’re wrong, but they could become true, that they are actually the best possible way of
conceptualizing of certain obvious trends in modern society. She argues that it’s “quite conceivable
that the modern age—which began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human
activity—may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known” (Zuboff 2019,
382). Simply put, the worry here is that the tools of instrumentarianism could lead to the
automation of the self as a necessary condition of the automation of society—all for the sake of
others’ profits. The worry here is that these tools will continue to cut away at our mental wilds to
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the point where our autonomy cannot be sustained—at the very least, in the meaningful sort way
which allows the sort of autonomy we would classify as human.

THE INTOLERABLE THREAT OF INSTRUMENTARIANISM
The degree to which surveillance capitalism diminishes our privacy is alone problematic
for our autonomy. The harms this system produces—from damaging the mental health of younger
generations to privatizing the division of learning in our society, from perpetuating discrimination
and inequality to bolstering corporate power over democratic governments—are unacceptable.
Now with the tools of instrumentarianism, corporations sell access to our autonomy. These tools
currently complicate our autonomy in problematic ways, but the potential threat that future
instrumentarian tools pose to our autonomy is too dangerous to ignore. To have our autonomy
disrupted and made vulnerable in such a way is to endure an intolerable harm.
Recall earlier commentary on how instrumentarian tools can make roughly 5% of people
do an action they otherwise wouldn’t have done. Perhaps it is the case that we might be okay with
these tools making people buy things they wouldn’t have otherwise bought. This is essentially the
goal of advertising, after all. Yet would we be okay with 5% percent of people voting for a
candidate they otherwise wouldn’t have voted for if these tools weren’t implemented? 5% is more
than enough to sway elections. Would we feel better about these tools if only 1% of people had
their beliefs manipulated, were made to believe something false about the world that influenced
they way they feel and live? What if instrumentarian tools were successfully deployed to make
only a handful of people fall into suicidal depression or only a handful of people violently hateful
towards a certain race? I don’t think we’d be okay with this. We accept that ads might alter our
behavior—to a point. The difference between instrumentarian tools and traditional advertising is
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that instrumentarianism is not mere persuasion. These tools are powered by a profound seizure of
our privacy, and they access our autonomy in a way traditional advertising does not. Recall earlier
commentary on how recent technological innovations grant instrumentarian tools the power to
know others more than they know themselves. The worry here is that instrumentarian tools push
something like targeted advertising into targeted manipulation: by leveraging intimate details
about ourselves we might not even know, instrumentarian tools allow others to exert this influence
in getting us to act, think, or desire in ways we otherwise wouldn’t have. Furthermore,
instrumentarian tools operate without our awareness, while advertisements are legally required to
label themselves as ads. Advertisers would very much like not to label their ads as ads, because
when we know an ad is an ad it is less effective at persuading us. We’ve long acknowledged it is
in the public interest to regulate advertising—we’ve yet to do the same for the surveillance
technologies and tools of instrumentarianism which govern our modern technological goods and
services. And even if it was the case that these tools were just the future of advertising, the nature
of how they operate (that they our powered by our severely diminished privacy, that they directly
seek to disrupt our autonomy) makes them morally unacceptable under eudaimonic and
technomoral virtues ethics.
Both eudaimonic and technomoral virtue ethics stress the role our autonomy plays in our
ability to act and live well. After all, an important part of any virtue ethics is our ability to cultivate
virtues: this process cannot be automatic, but a form of conscious deliberation through which we
meaningfully choose the good life. By diminishing our privacy, surveillance technologies cut away
this space for free moral and cultural play, where we come to hone our virtues because we correctly
choose to, not because we’re coerced to. As Vallor herself asks: “If surveillance and nudging
technologies are marketed and embraced as yet one more social license to relinquish [the struggle
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for humans to exercise their moral agency], so that our moral lives may quietly and seamlessly
mold into the shapes programmed by Silicon Valley software engineers and technocrats … will
we become more or less like the human beings we wish to be?” (Vallor 2016, 204). Furthermore,
instrumentarianism completely disregards the role for human autonomy—something that is even
more offensive under eudaimonic ethics, as our autonomy is one of our deepest psychological
needs. Additionally, it’s worth mentioning that surveillance capitalism and its tools of
instrumentarianism are also completely unacceptable under Kantian morality, as they make
customers and users no longer ends in themselves but rather as means to others’ ends. In this new
economic order, autonomous thought and moral judgement are unpredictable influences that
compete with the influences that instrumentarianism seeks to impose, and therefore must be
extinguished.
Because our modern technological goods and services are governed by this logic, using
them appears to complicate the cultivation of nearly all technomoral and eudaimonic virtues. As
previously stated, cultivating the eudaimonic virtue of autonomy conflicts with instrumentarian
tools. But relatedness is also threatened—after all, one of the more surprising effects of social
media has been how it increases rates of depression and loneliness (Primack et al 2017, para. 5).
Competence can also be understood as under threat given the privatization of the division of
learning in society. The sheer amount of knowledge locked away from us—both the knowledge
about ourselves as well as the knowledge of how these technologies operate—hinders our ability
to hone our skills in a way that makes contributions to our physical and social environment.
Meanwhile, the technomoral virtue of self-control is threatened by how advanced techniques in
software design magnify the addictive qualities of apps. The technomoral virtue of honesty is
complicated by information and communication technologies that continue to aid and abet the
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distortion of truth, and the technomoral virtue of justice is complicated by the fact that modern
technological goods and services perpetuate discrimination and inequality. More arguments can
be made for each virtue, but I believe for now it is clear that the instrumentarian tools saturating
our modern technological goods and services hinder our capacity to live virtuously under
technomoral and eudaimonic virtue ethics.
Still, this is not to say that our modern technological goods and services themselves are
incompatible with living and acting virtuously. There is nothing about these goods and services
which requires our diminished privacy and threatened autonomy. We need not sacrifice our right
to privacy just to access our other rights. Our technology doesn’t have to be designed to expose
our autonomy. For Vallor, behavior modification technologies are outright unacceptable because
automating our moral agency is unacceptable. But Besser-Jones counters that automatic behavior
is not mindless behavior simply because it occurs outside of our conscious awareness, because it
does not entail that the behavior does not still reflect an agent’s beliefs about how and why they
ought to treat others well. In other words, automaticity can be a force of good, and we must only
better understand it so we may use it to our advantage (in this case, in our pursuit of acting well,
in pursuit of the good life). I find both views compelling: there does seem to be something
profoundly dissatisfying about automating away our moral agency even if doing so helps us
cultivate our virtues, but there does seem to be room for at least some of these technologies to be
permissible so long as we are the ones controlling them. For example, such tools would no longer
exert the power of instrumentarianism, because instead of someone else knowing and shaping our
behavior toward their ends, these tools would instead allow us to know and shape our own behavior
for our own ends. I don’t believe we need to resolve this tension between these two ethics systems,
however; even though they disagree on the potential for these tools to act in service of cultivating
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our virtues, they both vehemently agree that these tools in their current use are immoral and
incompatible with our virtues.
Furthermore, even if these tools in their current form weren’t problematic enough to
conflict with eudaimonic and technomoral virtue ethics, we have good reason to fear what future
versions of these tools might imply. If instrumentarian tools are perfected and remain unregulated,
then our autonomy does indeed appear to be in great danger. This is the conclusion of Zuboff, who
warns that “just as industrial civilization flourished at the expense of nature and now threatens to
cost us the Earth, an information civilization shaped by surveillance capitalism and its new
instrumentarian power will thrive at the expense of human nature and will threaten to cost us our
humanity” (Zuboff 2019, 12). Here, humanity refers not only to our autonomy engendered through
our privacy, but the values and morals we as a species uphold for ourselves. Historian Yuval Noah
Harari also imagines what our increasingly tech-dependent future has in store, specifically for the
growing disparity between those wealthy enough to benefit from emerging behavior-modifying
technologies and those poor and completely unprepared for such invasions and manipulative
methods. In fact, many scholars warn of the growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, of
how the rich continue to have access to beneficial technologies long before they trickle down to
the middle and lower classes. This is typically understood as how the quality of life rises: what
was a luxury for one generation becomes an expected good for the next. In modern times, we’re
witnessing a slight inversion of this trend, with “the privileged” being serviced more by people,
“the masses by machines” (O’Neil 2016, 8). This is what leads him to claim that the most important
fact about living in the 21st century is that we are now hackable animals. “To hack a human being,”
says Harari, “is to understand what’s happening inside you on the level of the body, of the brain,
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of the mind, so that you can predict what people will do … the real key is whether somebody can
understand you better than you understand yourself” (Thompson 2018, para. 15).
This is an interesting thought experiment, one of many which could be made when
imagining all the ways instrumentarian tools could develop in the future. The potential threat these
tools pose to our autonomy should give us great pause in evaluating the morality of our
technosocial contract, which appears to offer us our modern personhood in exchange for the
potential dismantling of our modern personhood through the elimination of our autonomy.
Specifically, this elimination could be realized if instrumentarianism diminishes our autonomy
below the threshold that’s required for an act, thought, or desire to be considered autonomous. As
previously argued, we might not care as much when we lose autonomy while shopping at a store,
but we do care if we lose autonomy when it comes to intimate matters of the self. If our autonomy
is cancelled regarding acts, thoughts, and desires through which we form our identity, political and
religious convictions, or decisions on important life choices, then we fail to experience our
authentic selves as the source of the things we do and instrumentarianism proves to be an
intolerable threat.
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Part IV: Consent & Coercion

CURRENT THEORIES ON CONSENT & COERCION
To assess whether or not our technosocial contract is justified given the context of
surveillance capitalism and its tools of instrumentarianism, I will be looking to leading theories on
consent and coercion. Consent is important because if enjoying the goods of modern life entails
threats to our privacy, those threats become permissible so long as people consent to diminishing
their privacy in order to access these goods. It is through consent that this exchange succeeds or
fails to be morally transformative.
One of the most influential contemporary scholars on consent is Alan Wertheimer. He
argues that consent is best understood as a bilateral transaction between the consenter and the
recipient of consent. Consent and consent transactions place importance on the well-being or
interests of the agent, as well as the agent’s autonomy. In collaboration with Franklin G. Miller,
they argue for what they call a fair transaction model for consent transactions:
A is morally permitted to proceed on the basis of a consent transaction if A has treated B fairly
and responds in a reasonable manner to B’s token or expression of consent or what A
reasonably believes is B’s token or expression of consent. (p. 81)
Moral transformation refers to the process through which an action becomes morally permissible,
whereas without this process it would be morally impermissible to follow through. For consent to
be morally transformative, both sides of the transaction must be treated fairly, under the correct
conditions. This is what leads them to argue that in most contexts “no means no” whereas there
are many contexts where we shouldn’t assume “yes means yes”—this is the difference between
morally transformative consent and valid consent. They conclude that although morally
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transformative consent generally tracks valid consent, this is not always the case, and therefore the
presence of valid consent alone is not sufficient for moral transformation. In doing so, they don’t
mean to suggest other conceptions of consent such as informed consent aren’t useful, but that they
believe the “deeper ethical truth is that it is moral transformation that matters” (Wertheimer and
Miller 2010, 101). Consider two partners about to engage in sexual intercourse where one partner
is blackout drunk. The intoxicated partner provides valid consent by vocalizing and affirming their
consent to sex, but complications arise as most would agree this consent is not morally
transformative: most would agree that this it is not a case of meaningful consent. Wertheimer and
Miller argue that the correct conditions for fair treatment on consent transactions are when consent
is voluntary, informed, and competent. Whether these conditions are met or not is extremely
context dependent; it’s impossible for an individual to fulfill these conditions perfectly.
Informed consent is an important branch of consent scholarship. It has been influential in
bioethics, but other fields are ripe for its application. As noted previously, the overwhelming
majority of individuals do not fully read terms and conditions before agreeing to whatever privacy
policy their given technological good or service is requiring them to agree to. Furthermore, even
if individuals read through these terms and conditions, it is unclear if they can be truly said to be
informed, as most still do not know the depths to which their privacy is diminished, nor how these
terms and conditions exploit and harm them and their loved ones—and they certainly aren’t aware
of the instrumentarian tools deployed against them after clicking agree. This has led many to
consider informed consent an important concept to consider when crafting privacy policies.
According to philosophers Tom Beauchamp and Ruth R. Faden, autonomy is important for
informed consent. They argue it is in virtue of autonomous authorization that we feel satisfied in
an act being one of informed consent. Autonomous authorization occurs when 1) one assumes
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responsibility for what one has authorized and transfers to someone else the authority to implement
it, and 2) one also understands these features of the act and intends to perform that act (Beauchamp
et al 1986, 280). They frame autonomous actions as: “X acts autonomously only if X acts 1)
intentionally, 2) with understanding and 3) without controlling influences” (Beauchamp et al 1986,
238). They further qualify that informed consent is an ideal, and that though it’s rare for people’s
actions to ever be fully autonomous, we can still promote a certain threshold of autonomy we want
to uphold in our conception of consent. And in order for people to reach this standard, there is a
certain level of intentionality, understanding, and privacy (what Beauchamp and Faden refer to as
our actions occurring without controlling influences) that must be met.
Coercion is important because as long as scholars across disciplines have defined and
revised the concept of coercion, the consensus has been that coercion invalidates consent, that
coercion cannot coexist with consent. This is because coercion complicates our autonomy by
effectively forcing us to do something we would rather not do but do so anyways because we feel
we have no other choice—perhaps because we’re threatened or saw no other legitimate alternative.
An interesting feature of coercion is the facade of legitimacy: after someone has ‘forced’ someone
else to do something they didn’t want to do, the person coerced is thought to have consented—at
least, until this ‘forcing’ is properly recognized. Coercion does not always work like this, but it is
worth noting how often coercion does work like this.
Traditional philosophical views hold that threats coerce but offers do not—a stance
Wertheimer agrees with, as its consistent with his two-prong theory of coercion. Modeling his
theory after an expansive review of US law, he argues that a contract is made under duress only if
1) the consenter has no choice and 2) the propositions in the contract are morally wrong
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(Wertheimer 1987, 40). According to Wertheimer, the distinction which allows threats to coerce
but not offers can be summarized as through the following:
A threatens B by proposing to make B worse off relative to some baseline. More precisely,
A makes a threat when, If B does NOT accept A’s proposal, B will be worse off than in
the relevant baseline position. A makes an offer when, if B dot NOT accept A’s proposal,
he will be no worse off than in the relevant baseline position (p. 204).
Beauchamp and Faden agree with Wertheimer that threats coerce whereas offers do not. They
argue coercion only occurs if 1) the agent of influence intends to influence the other person by
presenting a severe threat and 2) if this threat is credible and irresistible (Beauchamp and Faden
1986, 261).
Other scholars have put forth alternative models of coercion which seem applicable in
examining our technosocial contract—specifically, that offers can indeed be coercive. David
Zimmerman argues that “the intuitive idea underlying coercion is that the person who does the
coercing undermines or limits the freedom of the person who is coerced” (Zimmerman 1981, 134).
Using a model of coercion set by Michael Garnett, he argues that an offer is coercive only if an
individual would prefer to move from the normally expected pre-proposal situation to the proposal
situation, but he would strongly prefer even more to move from the actual pre-proposal situation
to some alternative pre-proposal situation. Zimmerman uses the example of capitalist wages offers
to show how offers may prove coercive. Many scholars have debated whether or not the wage
bargain in a capitalist labor market is coercive if the worker is limited to a choice between
unpalatable alternatives, such as choosing to either work at a low-paying, miserable job or go
starving. According to Zimmerman, a wage offer is coercive if and only if 1) an alternative preproposal situation workers would strongly prefer to the actual one is technologically and
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economically feasible when the offer is made, and 2) capitalists prevent workers from having at
least one of these feasible alternative pre-proposal situations (Zimmerman 1981, 145). Joan
McGregor offers another way of understanding coercive offers after examing the marketplace in
terms of bargaining power. According to McGregor, offers may coerce when the effect on the
individual asking to consent is a choice between evils, the lesser of which is to acquiesce—in other
words, threats put the victim in a vulnerable position, but offers find the victim in a vulnerable
position, where “the weaker party has no workable alternatives since there is collusion in the
industry making actual alternatives an illusion” (McGregor 1988, 45).
Again, the dominant view in current philosophy on consent and coercion is that threats
coerce but offers do not. Beauchamp and Faden argue that coercive offers aren’t coercive because
even if an offer is made in a setting in which it is abnormally attractive, it would be better classified
as manipulation or some other sort of wrong. Much of their hesitancy to allow exploitation to
qualify as coercion seems to come back to concerns over who caused the miserable state of affairs
for the consenter. Other times, they argue that “freedom-enhancing exploitative offers do not
coerce” because they expand rather than reduce one’s options relative to one’s moral baselines
(Wertheimer 1987, 233).

APPLYING THE CONTEXT OF OUR TECHNOSCIAL CONTRACT
Although these philosophers disagree on whether or not an offer may be coercive, all agree
that whether or not consent has been coerced depends on the specific context of the contract in
question. When we consider the context of our technosocial contract—all the harms surveillance
capitalism entails, the instrumentarian tools which cut away our mental wilds to access our
autonomy—then there does indeed appear to be something problematic about exchanging privacy
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for access to modern technological goods and services. If an individual declines to consent, they
are denied the means to realize modern personhood and fulfill their autonomy—an unbearable
harm. But if an individual accepts, then they’re entering an exploitative system of various harms
where instrumentarian tools endanger their autonomy. A case could be made that both options are
psychologically unrealistic to expect people to choose. But considering how immediate the threat
of denied modern personhood is, compared to how delayed the harms from surveillance capitalism
might be and how instrumentarian tools often exert undue influence over us without our awareness,
then it seems that psychological realism would hold that it is illogical to expect people to choose
the immediate and more obvious harm of denied modern personhood. Still, choosing between an
unbearable harm and an intolerable harm doesn’t seem like much of a choice; this exchange
doesn’t feel morally transformative.
Although Wertheimer, Miller, Beauchamp, and Faden would say that an offer cannot
coerce (and our technosocial contract does indeed appear to be some sort of offer) their theories
on consent suggest that there is something about our technosocial contract which fails to yield
morally transformative consent. Regarding Wertheimer and Miller’s Fair Transaction Model, it
seems dubious at best to claim that corporations are treating us fairly. After all, corporations
control modern technological goods and services—essentially monopolizing access to the goods
of life and our fulfillment of modern personhood. Note here how much control they have over
these, too: they choose which content we can access, they control what platforms we use to connect
with others, shop, and work. We have no alternatives. Then they outright claim our human
experience as free raw material for them to profit off of. They deploy instrumentarian tools (which
we often don’t even know about) to access our autonomy, exerting undue influence over us in
order to alter our behaviors, desires, and emotions in service of their commercial interests. Nothing

69
about this is fair. Furthermore, surveillance capitalist corporations have a habit of not responding
in a reasonable manner to our token of consent—specifically when we decline to give our consent.
There have been many cases where corporations find ways to surveil us even if we click disagree—
a prominent example of this is Facebook, which is able to surveil all web users (including nonFacebook users) through the “Like” button being embedded on sites across the internet (Zuboff
2019, 158). Even if users disable the browser plug-in Google Toolbar, studies have shown that
Google continues to surveil them through this plug-in across competing search engines (Zuboff
2019, 131). Meanwhile, when we click disagree we often run the risk of corporations punishing us
for doing so27: as one illuminating example, Nest is a smart thermostat made by Google. Should a
customer refuse to agree to Nest’s terms of agreement (consisting of nearly a thousand so-called
contracts), the device will not work properly, with consequences ranging from frozen pipes to
failed smoke alarms to an easily hackable internal home system (Zuboff 2019, 7). All of this seems
to suggest that our technosocial contract should not be considered a fair transaction. Perhaps it
yields valid consent by technicality, but it is not morally transformative—which is the sort of
consent Wertheimer is concerned with.
Another way our technosocial contract fails at being morally transformative for
Wertheimer is through the nature of wrongful proposals. According to Wertheimer, it is wrong to
propose to do that which is independently illegal, while it is generally not wrong to propose to
exercise a legal right (Wertheimer 1987, 38). According to eudaimonic and technomoral virtues
ethics, our technosocial contract is making a proposal that is morally wrong because it directly
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As seen with Nest, this typically involves corporations rendering devices inoperable—not
because devices like vacuums or fridges desperately need to diminish our privacy and render our
autonomy exploitable in order to function, but because surveillance capitalist corporations make
more money when they do so.
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conflicts with the cultivation of the virtues we care about. While it is the case that most of what
our technosocial contract is imposing is technically legal, it is not clear that what’s being imposed
stems from corporations’ legal rights. It’s important to recall that when surveillance capitalism
originated with Google, they were breaching into territory that was unregulated and
incomprehensible to even those in the tech industry at the time. In fact, investors were initially
impressed and mystified at how Google earned so much profits without selling any material assets.
Furthermore, regulation on surveillance technologies as well as legislation protecting consumer
privacy has been outpaced by the developing technologies within surveillance capitalism, and
there’s currently no regulation on tools of instrumentarianism. Throughout American history,
powerful corporations have used the Constitution to fight off unwanted government regulations.28
As previously mentioned, Zuboff credits the success of surveillance capitalism to the neoliberal
policies that surged in the wake of 9/11. Neoliberalism can be generally understood as the political
theory that personal liberty is maximized when government interference in the free market is
limited. Often associated with laissez-faire economics, neoliberal policies seek to limit government
regulation over corporations as much as possible. According to Zuboff, these policies initiated a
“slow and transformative shift tying our social needs inextricably with corporations” (Zuboff 2019,
40). As it stands, however, corporations do not have an explicit legal right to be surveilling us or
using instrumentarianism against us. Moreover, we as citizens in a democracy define the rights
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Although corporations have also used the Constitution to fight off unconstitutional regulations,
here I refer to corporate America’s history of using the Constitution to fight off regulations they
merely don’t want but would otherwise be constitutional and beneficial for consumers. One way
we see this under surveillance capitalism is through free speech fundamentalism. This concept
holds that individuals have an absolute right to free speech. According to Zuboff, surveillance
capitalists have deflected scrutiny over their operations by shielding themselves behind the First
Amendment—all while their practices are antidemocratic in spirit and in effect hinder an
individual’s ability to speak freely (Zuboff 2019, 110).
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corporations are entitled to—not the other way around. What I argue is that our technosocial
contract functions as a wrongful proposal under Wertheimer’s framework. Just because this
proposal isn’t illegal doesn’t mean it’s not wrongful. We have good reason to regard this proposal
as morally wrongful, just as we also have good reason to regulate or in some cases outright ban
some of the practices that is inside this proposal. Wertheimer himself admits that there are
exceptions to his conception of wrongful proposals—I believe we have good reason to consider
the context of our technosocial contract as one of them.
It's also worth noting that an important component to Wertheimer’s understanding of
coercion is how duress can make a proposal qualify as coercive. While the second prong of his
theory deals with the wrongfulness of a proposal, the first prong deals with whether an individual
had any reasonable or acceptable alternative. In other words, a contract might prove coercive if an
individual is under duress and feels they have no choice—Wertheimer believes that some version
of this theory provides the best account of coercion in his review of contract law (Wertheimer
1987, 36). As previously outlined throughout this project, the conditions surveillance capitalism
imposes upon us could certainly constitute duress. If so, then even if an individual had nothing to
do with bringing about this duress, any token of consent exchanged could still fail to be morally
transformative.
Likewise, Beauchamp and Faden’s conception of informed consent appears wildly
incompatible with our technosocial contract. First and foremost, surveillance capitalism’s
privatization of the division of learning—and the profound asymmetry in knowledge it produces—
should make us wary of the average individual’s ability to understand what exactly is being asked
of them in our technosocial contract. And as I’ve previously explained, converging technological
innovations have allowed us to extract more information than ever before. While it could be said
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an individual acts intentionally, we have good reason to doubt an individual in this scenario could
act with understanding—and they’re certainly not acting without controlling influences. After all,
consenting to this technosocial contract means signing up to be bombarded by instrumentarian
tools seeking to control us by exerting undue influence us. Additionally, Beauchamp and Faden
base their understanding of autonomy specifically through Kant, and they believe their framework
for informed consent is consistent with the Kantian conception of autonomy. As I’ve argued
earlier, our technosocial contract goes against Kant’s conception of autonomy to the point that we
would be morally required to click disagree. This (as well as previous points) seems to suggest
that our technosocial contract is not conducive to autonomous authorization, and therefore not
conducive to informed consent.
Given the context of our technosocial contract, it appears that Wertheimer, Miller,
Beauchamp, and Faden would indeed find something problematic about this exchange—yet they
withhold the term coercion, and argue that offers cannot coerce. But they also do not identify what
exactly is wrong about this exchange, just that seems to fail at being morally transformative. Until
they address what that problem is, I believe we can move on and consider how our technosocial
contract could classify as coercion.

THE LOGIC OF COERCIVE OFFERS
Before I address how our technosocial contract does indeed appear to act as a coercive
offer, I want to revisit Wertheimer’s critique of coercive offers as well as what appears to be the
most common rebuttal against the existence of coercive offers: that exploitative offers do not
coerce so long as they’re mutually beneficial or freedom-enhancing.
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According to Wertheimer, threats coerce because they propose to make someone worse off
than they would otherwise be, whereas offers do not coerce because if someone declines this
proposal than they’re no worse off than they were before. Yet it does not logically follow that
offers cannot coerce. Let’s say I’m on a sinking ship and I do not know how to swim. A lifeboat
passes by offering to ferry me to shore, but only in exchange for me and any of my potential heirs
to be in service to them forever. If I decline, I’ll drown, so of course I “consent” to this exchange.
This would be a coercive offer.29 Wertheimer would agree with this. In other words, this offer
functions as both offer and threat—the offer is safe passage home, and the threat is that if I decline
this offer then I will drown. In applying this to our technosocial contract, the offer is access to
modern technological goods and services at the cost of our privacy and therefore autonomy, and
the threat is being denied our modern personhood. We can extrapolate more threats from this
exchange—as NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden comments in his memoir aptly titled
Permanent Record, the unilateral collection of everyone’s data carried the tantamount threat that
if you ever got out of line, your private life could be used against you. “Imagine it,” he writes, “all
the secrets big and small that could end your marriage, end your career, poison even your closest
relationships, and then leave you broke, friendless, and in prison,” (Snowden 2019, 198). Such
secrets—from the sequencing of your DNA to swapped nudes with your lover—are now stored by
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This example and critique of Wertheimer’s argument is similar to that of McGregor, who argues
that offers may coerce when the effect on the individual asking to consent is a choice between two
evils, the lesser of which is to acquiesce. In other words, threats put the victim in a vulnerable
position, but offers find the victim in a vulnerable position, where “the weaker party has no
workable alternatives since there is collusion in the industry making actual alternatives an illusion”
(McGregor 1988, 45). Under surveillance capitalism, there is certainly collusion among
corporations to pressure politicians to keep allowing the dominance of surveillance technologies
and instrumentarian tools across our modern technological goods and services.
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corporations, governments, and whoever else came across your personal data at is sold, analyzed,
and instrumentalized to modify your behavior.
Reconsider how Wertheimer, Miller, Beauchamp, and Faden are hesitant to allow
exploitation like this to qualify as coercion due to concerns over who caused the miserable state
of affairs for the consenter. After all, the lifeboat passing by me did not cause my ship to sink, and
their offer certainly grants me more freedom than a watery death. Aside from the fact that, again,
this offer appears to also be a threat, we should question this notion that mutually beneficial
exploitative offers or freedom-enhancing exploitative offers do not coerce. Consider the fight for
labor rights in the US: for almost half of this nation’s history, child labor appeared to be mutually
beneficial and therefore not coercive—yet now we would judge this as abhorrent, coercive, and
indefensible. In fact, it could be argued that exploitation is always coercive, so long as it’s judged
in the right context. Now we appreciate the context of child labor which makes it coercive—
perhaps in the future we will also appreciate the context which lets us see capitalist wage offers
(the main focus of most scholarship for and against coercive offers) as coercive.
What seems to allow exploitative wage offers to be permissible is this notion that
employers aren’t at fault because they’re not the ones who made the employee’s conditions so dire.
Would we say the same of the employers who used exploitative wage offers to hire children to go
work in mines? I don’t believe we would. This is because, as Wertheimer notes, we care more
about consent being morally transformative than being valid. Exploitative offers might be valid,
but they often fail to feel morally transformative—and I argue they feel so because what we care
about is that someone is being coerced. Someone or something does indeed have to be coercing in
order for someone to be coerced—but they don’t necessarily have to be the employer or the person
initiating this contract. Again, the lifeboat didn’t sink my ship, but I’m nonetheless being coerced.
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And at the very least, I argue that we should resist any calls to allow exploitative offers a free pass
just because the exchange appears to be mutually beneficial to us right now.
There are two ways we can understand our technosocial contract as a coercive offer—first,
through the inherent coercive nature within this exchange, and secondly, through Zimmerman’s
examination of capitalist wage offers. There are many coercive elements at play within our
technosocial contract, but perhaps the most extraordinary coercive element is the fact that this
exchange is asking us to consent to endanger our autonomy. Consider the fact that the whole point
of this contract is to excuse the invasion of our privacy by having an individual consent. This
seems to imply that this exchange cares a great deal about consent. Yet as previously argued,
consent hinges on autonomy—we cannot truly be said to consent if we’re not doing so
autonomously, or at least to a substantial degree. But if we do consent in this exchange, then we
are rendering our autonomy exploitable in profound and potentially devastating ways. We might
wonder why then we’re being asked to autonomously consent in the first place if this exchange is
going to then immediately encourage the targeting of our autonomy—that alone seems to suggest
something isn’t quite right with this offer.
When we push this further, however, a clear coercive element comes into play. By clicking
agree, we are entering a marketplace for others to disrupt our autotomy with instrumentarian
tools—and if these tools are successful enough, do indeed diminish our autonomy enough, then
this thereby damages our ability to autonomously consent on the next inevitable round of this
technosocial contract. In other words, by clicking agree we’re agreeing to be subjected to tools of
instrumentarianism that directly inhibit our ability to click disagree. If the intuitive idea underlying
coercion is that my freedom is being undermined by the person or entity coercing me, then our
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technosocial contract seems not only coercive, but hypocritical: it claims to care so much about
the thing it seeks to immediately snuff out.
The other way we can understand our technosocial contract as a coercive offer is through
Zimmerman’s examination of capitalist wage offers. First, it should be acknowledged that typical
philosophical framing around coercive offers is of wages: an exchange between an employer and
employee. I believe Zimmerman convincingly argues that certain capitalist wage offers might be
coercive, but what’s perhaps even more important is what happens when we apply his strategy to
surveillance capitalist offers. Recall how under surveillance capitalism we are neither workers nor
consumers, but terrain to harvest from. This is a transformative shift. Before, monopolies on goods
and services disfigured markets by unfairly eliminating competition in order to raise prices at will.
Under surveillance capitalism, however, many of the practices defined as monopolistic actually
function as means of cornering user-derived raw-material supplies, as Zuboff writes: “There is no
monetary price for the user to pay, only an opportunity for the company to extract data…. We are
the source of the coveted commodity: our experience is the target of extraction,” (Zuboff 2019,
132).
I argue there is something inherently coercive in the offer of modern personhood at the cost
of what is essentially an economic mutation of indentured servitude: instead of contracting yourself
to work for someone else until a certain amount of time has passed, you’re contracting yourself to
be harvested for raw material and to be subject to instrumentarian tools of behavior modification
just so you may access things like social media, healthcare, and education—and for however as
long as you wish to enjoy your modern personhood, you will need to continue being monitored,
mined, and unduly influenced.
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Though a wage offer is of a different sort of offer, Zimmerman’s model for coercive offers
is still informative. Surveillance capitalist offers certainly seem to fit the spirit of his criteria. It is
certainly technologically and economically feasible for us to use modern technological goods and
services which don’t invade our privacy and threaten our autonomy. I believe it is uncontroversial
to claim that this is certainly the preferred alternative pre-proposal situation for most modern
citizens. And if capitalists could ever have been said to prevent workers from having at least one
feasible alternative pre-proposal situation (i.e. access to non-hazardous, not-horribly paying jobs),
then surely it can be reasonably claimed that surveillance capitalists actively seek and are
extraordinarily successful at preventing modern citizens from accessing technological goods and
services which don’t exploit and harm them. This is what Zuboff claims through her conception
of the new sort of contractual forms emerging in the wake of surveillance capitalism:
The uncontract is a feature of the larger complex that is the means of behavioral
modification, and it is therefore an essential modality of surveillance capitalism … it
contributes to economies of action by leveraging proprietary behavioral surplus to preempt
and foreclose action alternatives, thus replacing the indeterminacy of social processes with
the determinism of programmed machine processes … The uncontract is not a space of
contractual relations but rather a unilateral execution that makes those relations
unnecessary (p. 220).
If surveillance capitalists continue to exert effective influence over an individual’s ability to access
technological goods and services which don’t surveil or deploy instrumentarian tools against them,
then it seems as though surveillance capitalism easily fulfills the spirit of Zimmerman’s criteria:
offers are coercive when an alternative pre-proposal situation is feasible and sufficiently better

78
than the actual offer which capitalists prevent citizens from having alternative options to
(Zimmerman 1981, 140).
All of this seems to suggest that we should consider our technosocial contract to be
coercive. Although this exchange doesn’t fit the narrow definition of coercion of Wertheimer,
Miller, Beauchamp, and Faden, I argue that this is the most appropriate term. Specifically, I believe
my previous arguments as well as Zimmerman’s examination into exploitative capitalist wages
suggest that we have good reason to consider this exchange a coercive offer. Recalling Solove’s
application of Wittgenstein’s family of resemblances to the definition of privacy, we might also
want to consider coercion as a cluster-concept—at the very least, we shouldn’t be afraid to revise
our definition of coercion as new contexts require us to. And while it might be the case that
Wertheimer Wertheimer, Miller, Beauchamp, and Faden could argue that this exchange is
problematic in ways befitting other terminology, this would become a debate over semantics, not
whether or not our technosocial contract is capable of producing meaningful consent.

79

Part V: Conclusion

CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Before I conclude, I will preemptively consider expected arguments against different
claims within my overarching thesis. I will begin by examining the GDPR—the toughest privacy
security law in the world. The GDPR is the most robust and lauded iteration of our technosocial
contract; if I am to argue our current technosocial contract is logically unjustified, then I must also
prove the GDPR is equally flawed. The GDPR is aimed at protecting the privacy of citizens in the
European Union against data collection and processing. This law does more to address the
problems inherent within our technosocial contract than any other laws. Concepts such as the Right
to be Forgotten are insightful and indicative of the sort of theorizing we will need to be doing more
of in the future.30 I argue, however, that this law still fails to justify the exchange of privacy for
accessing modern technological services. All five “strict new rules” defining what constitutes
consent do not address the coercive nature of this exchange, which makes it such that actual
consent cannot be given from the very “data subjects” this law aims to protect. Additionally, I echo
concerns of scholars such as Véliz, in that this legislation does not go nearly as far enough in
protecting our privacy in the age of surveillance capitalism. She argues that certain rules in the

30

The right to be forgotten is the right to have private information about a person be removed from
internet searches and other directories under certain circumstances. Véliz notes that this concept
protects us from being haunted by personal data that is outdated, inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant,
or devoid of purpose, and when there is no public interest (Véliz 2020, 149). Given my conception
of the goods of modern personhood, it can be reasonably argued that just as there might be a right
to be forgotten online, there should be a right to exist online. With social media becoming even
more entrenched in the careers, communities, and interactions which seem to characterize our
modern life, the fact that corporations retain the sole power over these platforms is frightening.
Perhaps the internet would better be reconceptualized as a public utility and social media as a
public platform, wherein proper regulation and protections would be subject to civilian oversight.
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GDPR are too broad, such as allowing companies to collect data for ‘legitimate interests’, and that
the GDPR still fails to address the issue of anonymized data that can later be deanonymized (Véliz
2020, 131). Surveillance capitalists will often claim that because data is anonymized, there is no
way to track the data back to its user, and therefore there are no privacy issues to be had. But
because anonymized data can be later de-anonymized, privacy issues can still emerge. It can also
be argued that just because data is completely anonymized this doesn’t mean our privacy wasn’t
violated. Some personal data—such as a final phone call to a loved one on their death bed—seems
like the sort of personal data in which it would be immoral to automatically seize such private
affairs as raw material for others’ profit and aims, even if this data were fully anonymized.
A common critique against any attempts to challenge the technological infostructures
shredding our privacy and enabling instrumentarianism can be classified as technofatalism: the
belief that technological advancement is inevitable, and that emerging surveillance technologies
are a part of this inevitability. Technofatalists believe it is naïve and illogical to fight for regulatory
or cultural restraints on surveillance technologies, and that there’s no effective steering away from
this course (Véliz 2020, 193). There seems to be a consensus among current philosophical
literature on privacy and technology that technofatalists are incorrect. It’s no coincidence that the
most rabid technofatalists are surveillance capitalists—Zuboff argues that big tech hopes we will
grow gradually accustomed to accepting conditions we would never have agreed to had they been
presented to us upfront from the start. Again, the unique circumstances surrounding our
technosocial contract seems to suggest coercion. Furthermore, Zuboff clarifies that surveillance
capitalism is not technology: it is a logic that imbues technology and commands it into action.
Technofatalism is a simply a classic misdirection to bewilder the public by conflating commercial
imperatives and technological necessity. I agree with Zuboff and many other scholars such as
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Vallor and Véliz that technofatalism is incorrect. Technofatalist critiques of my project can largely
be addressed by the previous arguments, but a technofatalist could also claim that it is unrealistic
for me to expect the goods of modern life to be so easily accessible without some sort of sacrifice
on my part. Yet this too seems surmountable: once again, there is nothing about our modern
technological goods and services which requires the economic logic of surveillance capitalism to
be structuring this transaction. As Zuboff also argues, surveillance capitalism was invented by a
specific group of human beings in a specific time and place—it’s not an inherent result of digital
technology, nor is it a necessary expression of information capitalism (Zuboff 2019, 85).
It could also be argued that the benefits of surveillance capitalism outweigh the drawbacks.
While surveillance technologies and instrumentarian tools have proven to exploit and harm thus
far, with proper regulation and civil protections, they could prove to be overwhelming forces of
good. A classic proponent of this sort of thinking is behaviorist B. F. Skinner, who believed tools
of behavior modification such as conditioning could be used for the greater good. I partially agree
with this, as do Vallor and Zuboff: it certainly could be that case that, in certain contexts,
surveillance technologies and instrumentarian tools do indeed function as an overwhelming good.
Yet we might wonder how the greater good can be determined when surveillance capitalism owns
the machines and the means of behavioral modification. As Zuboff writes: “The greater good is
someone’s good, but it may not be ours,” (Zuboff 2019, 432). This is because surveillance
capitalism is fundamentally profit driven, specifically driven to extract as much behavioral surplus
data as possible while modifying our behavior as discreetly as possible. These conditions do not
seem the sort of conditions where the type of well-meaning, overwhelmingly beneficial uses of
surveillance technologies and instrumentarian tools can flourish. For example, a traditional
technofatalist and pro-surveillance belief is that the more informed a population is, the better off
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they will be. Technology ethicists such as Evan Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog argue, however,
that there are many empirical studies which show that people suffering a supply of too much
information become more passive, less responsible, overwhelmed, and more likely to fall back on
dangerous cognitive biases and shortcuts in ethical judgment (Vallor 2016, 193).
Still, other proponents point to Quantified Self practices as potential ways
instrumentarianism ultimely servers the great good. These practices entail using wearable devices
to collect personal data about one’s own life and health. But the problem is that, right now, the
tools of instrumentarianism are not being used to make us better, they’re being used to sway our
political opinions or sell us products. Most nudging, tuning, and conditioning in surveillance
capitalism is not designed around self-betterment but around increasing profits. Vallor makes a
compelling case against these practices, citing evidence which shows that they do not fulfill the
aims of an examined life needed to cultivate virtue and promote sustained human flourishing
(much less their own alleged aims), adding that “the most accurate and comprehensive recording
of your past and present states would not constitute an examined life, because a dataset is not a life
at all” (Vallor 2016, 202).
Secondly, as things currently stand, surveillance capitalists not only monopolize the power
of instrumentarianism and enforce a severe power asymmetry of knowledge, but they also
monopolize our access to the goods of modern life. The fact that we cannot do things like learn at
school or communicate with a loved one far away without contracting ourselves as terrains to
harvested from by one of a handful of all-powerful, all-knowing corporations is a testament to how
much control surveillance capitalist exert over our capacity to enjoy modern personhood.
Surveillance capitalists are unregulated, highly active in lobbying politicians to prevent regulation
and funding academic research to manufacture their legitimacy. They can de-platform presidents
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and bully countries. Even if surveillance capitalism may sometimes function as an overwhelming
force of good, it remains to be seen is it can truly surmount the global sociopolitical threat that
corporations wielding instrumentarianism currently pose.

CONCLUSION
The problem with exchanging privacy for accessing modern technological goods and
services is that this exchange is incapable of producing meaningful consent. This is because our
technosocial contract can be best understood as a coercive offer, and consent cannot coexist with
coercion. Even if we do not want to use the term coercion to describe this exchange, leading
theories on consent still view this exchange as failing to be morally transformative—meaning this
exchange is still incapable of producing meaningful consent. Our technosocial contract therefore
remains unjustified. This is a problem, as courts continue to permit this technosocial contract as
legally binding, despite being incapable of producing meaningful consent. One solution could be
significant legislation severely restricting or banning practices such as the trade in personal data
and the use of instrumentarian tools. Other solutions could include curtailing the use surveillance
technologies and behavior modification technologies, and ending practices of default data
collection across corporations, institutions, and governments. At the very least, we need further
scholarship advising our politicians and judicial officials that there should be a new and justifiable
technosocial contract.
The loss of our mental wilds just entails too many harms to ignore. Perpetuating
discrimination and inequality, bolstering corporate control over both the goods of modern life and
democratic governments, hoarding the tools we need to live virtuously and flourish as human
beings—surveillance capitalism and its tools of instrumentarianism now seek to consume our
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mental wilds, byte by byte, with the potential of one day swallowing our autonomy whole. And of
all the fallouts from this siege, among the many tragedies is the loss of these mental wilds for the
young to grow up in. There are no artificial wilds, after all. Just as future generations might not
enjoy environmental conditions like an unpolluted shoreline or rain that’s not acidic, so are they
also positioned to not experience the environmental conditions favorable to privacy and the
production of their autonomy as generations before them enjoyed. Adding to this tragedy is how
the privatization of the division of knowledge lets surveillance capitalist corporations manufacture
their reality. What might become of a people made entirely of tuners and their tuned? They divide.
One ascends, rendering the other as total means to an end. This other isn’t even an ‘other’: plucked
of their human nature, the tuned stops functioning as people at all.
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